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INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom maintains that the Supreme Court ban-
ished general law from federal court in 1938. In Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, the Court famously declared that “[t]here is no federal
general common law.”  In so doing, the Court overruled its 18421
decision in Swift v. Tyson.  Modern accounts start from the premise2
that Swift and Erie represent irreconcilable conceptions of federal
judicial power, but this premise is mistaken. According to these
accounts, Swift viewed the common law as a “brooding omni-
presence,” rather than a sovereign act, and authorized federal courts
to disregard state common law in favor of general common law of
their own choosing.  Erie, by contrast, constrained such judicial3
lawmaking by interpreting the Constitution to banish general law
from federal courts in the face of contrary state law.  Because the4
Erie Court concluded that “the unconstitutionality of the course
pursued” was “clear,” it felt compelled to overrule Swift and aban-
don a doctrine that had been “widely applied throughout nearly a
century.”  The effect of this decision, it is said, was to prohibit fed-5
eral courts from applying general law unless it qualifies as state law
or, more controversially, as “federal common law.”6
1. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
2. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
3. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE
L.J. 829, 854 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2000)) (“[T]he received legal wisdom about Swift and Erie has
it that Swift was based on a misunderstanding about the nature of law. The Swift Court, in
the thrall of natural law, mistook law for a ‘brooding omnipresence.’” (internal citations
omitted)); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2011) (“We all know the story. At the time of Swift v. Tyson, federal
courts thought of the common law as a ‘brooding omnipresence’ about which they could make
their own judgments.” (internal citations omitted)).
4. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
5. Id. at 77-78.
6. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1245, 1247, 1264 (1996). Federal common law is controversial because judicial
lawmaking raises separation of powers concerns and because federal common law overrides
state law with no clear warrant in the Supremacy Clause for doing so. Id. at 1248-50.
Although some enclaves of federal common law are more defensible than others, a full
analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Although we agree that Erie rests on constitutional grounds, it
does not follow that Swift was unconstitutional when it was decided
or that the Constitution prohibits federal courts from applying
general law under any circumstances. To the contrary, Swift and
Erie represent compatible conceptions of federal judicial power
when each decision is understood in its full historical context. In our
view, Erie is best read as recognizing that federal courts must apply
state law unless required to disregard such law by the Supremacy
Clause. At the time Swift was decided, state common law largely
incorporated general commercial law. General commercial law, or
the law merchant, referred to shared commercial customs and prac-
tices among nations.  General law was distinct from local law, which
referred to law that applied only within the territorial jurisdiction
of a particular sovereign. At the time Swift was decided, a federal
court’s application of general commercial law did not implicate the
Supremacy Clause because federal and state courts alike did not
understand general commercial law to be the law of a particular
state. Accordingly, when federal courts applied general commercial
law, they did not displace state law, but rather acted in accord with
a state’s choice to apply general commercial law.
The relevant distinction at the time was not between general law
and state law, but between two kinds of state law: general law and
local law. General law was “an identifiable body of rules and cus-
toms developed and refined by a variety of nations over hundreds
and, in some cases, thousands of years.”  Such law addressed7
matters of concern to more than one sovereign, and no single sov-
ereign had the ability to fix its meaning. Thus, nations and states
used independent judgment to ascertain the content of general law,
and voluntarily applied such law in order “to foster peaceful
coexistence and to facilitate mutually beneficial transactions among
their citizens.”  Local law, by contrast, governed “rights and titles8
to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles
to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in
their nature and character.”  In England, the common law included9
7. Id. at 1279; see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal
Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 889-91 (2005) (describing general law).
8. Clark, supra note 6, at 1280.
9. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
2013] GENERAL LAW IN FEDERAL COURT 659
both general and local law, and the states adopted the common law
following independence. Swift acknowledged that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction were bound to follow state decisions
on matters of local law. Because the issue in Swift was one of
general commercial law, however, neither state nor federal courts
understood the applicable law to be local to any particular sover-
eign. This meant that federal courts—like state courts—were
expected to use independent judgment to ascertain the applicable
rule of decision.
Although Swift was defensible when decided, the “Swift doctrine”
that federal courts subsequently developed was problematic for two
reasons. First, states increasingly exercised their prerogative to
replace general commercial law with local law through both judicial
decisions and state statutes.  This development rendered the10
federal courts’ continued application of general commercial law in
diversity cases constitutionally problematic. Second, federal courts
steadily expanded their application of general law to matters
historically governed by local law, such as torts and even real estate
transactions.  In practice, these two developments meant that11
federal courts often disregarded state law with no warrant in the
Supremacy Clause for doing so. As a result, the law applied to simi-
larly situated litigants increasingly varied depending on whether
the case was tried in state or federal court.  Erie eliminated this12
disparity by holding, as a matter of constitutional law, that federal
courts must apply state law—whether written or unwritten—unless
such law is preempted by the Constitution, acts of Congress, or
treaties.13
Understood in historical context and in light of the constitutional
structure, Swift and Erie establish that there is no categorical
constitutional prohibition against the application of general law in
federal court. Rather, the application of such law is problematic only
when it disregards state law with no basis in the Supremacy Clause
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
13. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Although Erie mentions only “the Federal Constitution” and
“Acts of Congress,” id., treaties also qualify as “the supreme Law of the Land,” see U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2. 
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for doing so.  At the Founding, general law was synonymous with14
jus gentium, or the law of nations.  Courts and other writers15
recognized various branches of the law of nations, including the law
merchant (or general commercial law), the law maritime, and the
law governing relations between sovereign states.  In drafting16
Article III, the Founders fully expected federal courts to apply these
branches of the law of nations in appropriate cases.  Article III17
extended the federal judicial power not only to cases arising under
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, but also to
cases in which general law was likely to apply, such as diversity
cases between merchants, admiralty and maritime cases, and cases
affecting ambassadors. Consistent with these expectations, federal
courts applied the law merchant, the law maritime, and the law of
state-state relations in appropriate cases within their jurisdiction.
Initially, courts paid little attention to whether they should
classify general commercial law as state law because at the time
little turned on that classification.  In England, the common law18
incorporated much of general law as a set of default rules until
changed by Parliament. In the United States, the states received the
common law—and hence much of general law—as their own back-
ground law subject to future alterations. Early acts of Congress
generally required federal courts to apply state forms of proceeding
and state rules of decision in actions at law unless preempted by
enacted federal law. Although these directives required federal
courts to respect a state’s choice whether to apply general commer-
cial law or local law to particular disputes, federal courts did not
understand these statutes to require deference to state court
understandings of general law. Because no sovereign had unilateral
authority to prescribe the content of general law, the courts of each
sovereign exercised independent judgment to determine its content
and expected the courts of other sovereigns to do likewise. Thus, it
was largely immaterial whether federal courts classified general
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2009) (discussing the law of nations at the founding of the United
States).
16. See id.
17. Id. at 33-44.
18. See infra Part I.B.
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commercial law as part of state common law or as some other source
of law. Either way, federal courts were free to exercise independent
judgment regarding the content of general law.
By the late nineteenth century, however, state abandonment of
general commercial law and federal court expansion of the scope of
general law created a growing dichotomy between the law applied
in state and federal courts.  Increasingly, state courts applied local19
state law and federal courts applied so-called “general law” to the
same kinds of disputes. As a result, judges frequently applied dif-
ferent rules of decision to similar cases based solely on whether the
case was brought in state or federal court. Erie responded to the
states’ permissible localization of general law and the federal courts’
improper generalization of local law by holding that—in the absence
of supreme law of the land to the contrary—the Constitution re-
quires federal courts to follow state law, including state common law
as defined by state courts. 
To reach this conclusion, the Court implicitly invoked the neg-
ative implication of the Supremacy Clause.  Each source of federal20
law recognized by the Supremacy Clause—the Constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States—can only be adopted pursuant to
procedures that require the participation and assent of at least two
actors subject to “the political safeguards of federalism”: the House
of Representatives, the Senate, and the President.  More impor-21
tantly, each source of supreme federal law can only be adopted with
the participation and assent of the Senate—the federal institution
designed to represent the states—or, in the case of the Constitution,
with the assent of the states themselves.  These procedural safe-22
guards of federalism leave states free to govern their own affairs
unless and until the specified combination of political actors agree
19. See infra Part II.
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
21. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-44
(1954) (arguing that the states’ role in selecting the House, the Senate, and the President
operate as “political safeguards of federalism”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 358, 361
(James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864) (explaining the states’ role in the selection of
the national government and the advantages this role afforded states).
22. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1342-46 (2001) (“Federal lawmaking procedures, moreover, maximized state
influence by singling out the Senate ... to participate in all forms of federal lawmaking.”).
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to override state law.  By design, the states “are represented in the23
Congress but not in the federal courts.”  Thus, when federal courts24
disregarded state law in favor of general law of their own choosing,
they circumvented the political and procedural safeguards provided
by the Constitution  and “invaded rights ... reserved by the25
Constitution to the several States.”  26
Erie’s holding that federal courts must follow state law unless
preempted by the supreme law of the land does not mean that the
Constitution categorically prohibits federal courts from applying
general law.  The Erie Court’s statement that “[t]here is no federal27
general common law”  has generated confusion because it conflated28
two distinct categories of law: general law and local common law.
This statement is overbroad if taken to mean that federal courts
may never apply general law in cases within their jurisdiction. To
be sure, the Constitution requires federal courts to apply state law
to matters within state authority in the absence of supreme federal
law to the contrary. At the same time, however, the Constitution
places certain matters beyond state authority and sometimes re-
quires courts to apply general law as a means of upholding aspects
of the constitutional structure. Under Erie, the relevant constitut-
ional distinction is not whether general law or local law tradition-
ally governed a particular matter. Rather, the relevant distinction
under Erie is whether a particular matter falls within the (exclusive
or concurrent) authority of the states, or falls beyond state author-
ity. Erie determined that state law governs matters in the former
category unless and until such law is preempted by the supreme law
of the land. By contrast, however, general law may govern matters
23. Id. at 1329-30 (stating that the negative inference of the Supremacy Clause is that
state law remains in full force in the absence of federal law).
24. Paul J. Mishkin, Comment, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1682, 1685 (1974).
25. See Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1309-10
(2007) (discussing how courts’ application of general law post-Swift degenerated into “judicial
lawmaking,” circumventing safeguards built into the Supremacy Clause).
26. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
27. In practice, as Caleb Nelson has observed, federal courts continue to apply general law
in a range of contexts. See Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 505-25 (2006).
28. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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in the latter category when the application of such law is necessary
to uphold an aspect of the constitutional scheme. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the distinction
between local and general law that existed at the time of the
Founding and continued at least through Swift. Careful examina-
tion of judicial decisions reveals that both federal and state courts
applied local law in cases in which local law applied, and general
law in cases in which general law applied. This examination tends
to refute modern suggestions that the Swift Court misconstrued
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 or usurped state authority
under the Constitution.
Part II describes two subsequent developments that undermined
the Swift doctrine. First, states gradually abandoned general com-
mercial law in favor of local doctrines and statutes. Second, federal
courts gradually expanded their conception of “general law” to en-
compass matters traditionally governed by local law, such as torts
and titles to real property. The federal courts’ expansion and con-
tinued application of the Swift doctrine despite these two develop-
ments contradicted the Supremacy Clause by disregarding state law
with no basis in supreme federal law for doing so.
Part III explains why Erie does not prohibit the application of
general law by federal courts in all circumstances. The constitu-
tional principles applied in Erie require federal courts to distinguish
between matters that fall within the exclusive or concurrent power
of the states on the one hand, and those that fall beyond state au-
thority on the other. As to the first category, Erie requires federal
courts to follow state law in the absence of a controlling provision of
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. But Erie
does not prohibit federal judicial application of general law in cases
beyond state regulatory authority. Indeed, sometimes federal courts
must apply principles derived from general law in order to uphold
basic features of the constitutional structure that preempt state law,
such as the Constitution’s allocation of specific foreign relations
powers to the federal political branches.  29
29. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 15, at 33-44; see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford
R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 733-34 (2012).
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I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GENERAL AND LOCAL LAW
To understand why the Supreme Court’s original decision in Swift
was consistent with the constitutional principles applied in Erie, one
must begin by recognizing the traditional distinction between local
and general law.  Local law was a body of written and unwritten30
law that concerned matters specific to a particular state or a nation,
such as real property rights.  General law was a body of general31
rules and customs that concerned matters of common interest to
more than one jurisdiction.  States and nations applied general law32
in order to advance their mutual interest in peace and prosperity.
At the time Swift was decided, states had widely adopted general
commercial law as part of their common law to govern commercial
transactions between citizens of different states as well as certain
kinds of transactions between their own citizens. The content of
such law was not understood to be the command of any particular
sovereign, but the product of reason and the common practices of
the civilized world. Given the nature of general law, courts applying
such law considered themselves free to exercise independent judg-
ment to ascertain its content. Although state and federal courts
sometimes disagreed about the precise content of such law, they
understood themselves to be jointly administering a common body
of law. Accordingly, neither state nor federal courts regarded the
others’ failure to follow their decisions on questions of general law
as improper or an invasion of sovereign authority.
A. Local Law and General Law
“Municipal” law was understood to be the law of a particular
nation or district within a nation. In his Commentaries on the Laws
of England, William Blackstone defined “municipal” law as “the rule
30. See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 26-29 (1981); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1516-17
(1984) (discussing the distinction between general and local law).
31. See Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1532-33 (discussing courts’ general guidelines for
distinguishing between general and local law).
32. See id.
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by which particular districts, communities, or nations are gov-
erned.”  In “common speech,” the expression “municipal law ...33
applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the same
laws and customs.”  (Because the United States has a federal34
system, the federal government and each state has its own “munici-
pal” law.)
English writers described two forms of municipal law: unwritten
and written.  Unwritten customs, Blackstone explained, are “the35
universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common law, in
its ... usual signification.”  The judges of the several courts of36
Westminster had the duty to determine the content of the common
law.  They professed to determine this law from prior judicial37
records  or, when no prior decision resolved a question, from38
established custom and reason.  In addition to the common law,39
England had a written municipal law. The “legis scriptae, the writ-
ten laws of the kingdom,” according to Blackstone, were “statutes,
acts, or edicts, made by the king’s majesty by and with the advice
and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal and commons in
33. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44.
34. Id.
35. See id. at *63 (“The municipal law of England, or the rule of civil conduct prescribed
to the inhabitants of this kingdom, may with sufficient propriety be divided into two kinds:
the lex non scripta, the unwritten, or common law; and the lex scripta, the written, or statute
law.”).
36. Id. at *67.
37. See id. at *69 (“[H]ow are these customs or maxims to be known, and by whom is their
validity to be determined? The answer is, by the judges in the several courts of justice.”).
38. See, e.g., R v. Despard, (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1226 (K.B.) 1230 (opinion of Lord Kenyon
C.J.) (“[T]he records of the Court furnish me with the law of the land.”). See generally
BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *69 (“And indeed these judicial decisions are the principal and
most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form
a part of the common law.”).
39. See Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 921, 931-37 (2013). For judicial statements that the common law could exist even in
the absence of judicial decisions expressly stating it, see Despard, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1230, 1230
(opinion of Lord Kenyon C.J.) (“To one argument used by the defendant’s counsel I cannot
assent, namely, that no point is to be considered as law, unless it has been made and
judicially decided: if that were true, farewell to the common law of the land.”); id. at 1231
(opinion of Ashhurst J.) (“It is rather an extraordinary position ... that nothing is to be
considered as law but what has been solemnly decided; for a point may be so clear that it was
never doubted, and yet if this position were well founded, it would not be law.”); Paget v. Gee,
(1753) 27 Eng. Rep. 133 (Ch.) 134 (“Where this court finds out the law of the land in any
instances, they will follow and extend it to other cases that are analogous.”).
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parliament assembled.”  Both written and unwritten municipal law40
provided rules of decision in English courts.
In addition, municipal law in England drew a distinction between
local law and general law, a distinction important to understanding
Swift.  Matters subject to local law were typically those that oc-41
curred within the territorial jurisdiction of the state and affected
only that state, such as trusts and estates, property, local contracts,
civil injuries, and crime. Local law could be written or unwritten.
General law was an unwritten body of law based on custom and the
laws of nature and reason. Matters governed by general law origi-
nally were those of interest to more than one state, such as com-
mercial transactions between citizens of different states, maritime
matters, and the relations between sovereign states.  42
England voluntarily incorporated principles of general law into its
municipal law because general law fostered peaceful relations and
international commerce.  Such incorporation occurred through both43
common law and statutory adoption. Blackstone equated “general
law” with the “law of nations,” describing this law to encompass the
law of state-state relations, the law merchant, and the law mari-
time.  In particular, he explained that 44
in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like;
in all marine causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage,
insurances, bottomry, and others of a similar nature; the law-
merchant, which is a branch of the law of nations, is regularly
and constantly adhered to. So too in all disputes relating to
prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there is no
other rule of decision but this great universal law, collected from
history and usage, and such writers of all nations and languages
as are generally approved and allowed of.45
40. BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *85.
41. Id. at *67-68.
42. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
43. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66-67.
44. Id. at *66.
45. Id. at *67.
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As Philip Hamburger has emphasized, however, general law pro-
vided rules of decision in English courts only to the extent that the
municipal laws of England, including the common law, adopted it.  46
Following the Declaration of Independence, the states applied
their own written and unwritten municipal law within their re-
spective territories. By receiving the common law, the newly inde-
pendent states made such law part of their own municipal law. The
common law they received necessarily included both aspects of local
law developed in England and those parts of the general law
adopted by the English common law. States did not regard the
content of general law as the command of any particular sovereign,
but elected to apply it—as England had—in order to foster peaceful
relations and commercial transactions with other nations and
states. Of course, each state reserved the right to adapt the common
law to its local conditions, but each state’s reception of the common
law immediately gave it a developed body of municipal law by which
to govern itself.47
With the adoption of the Constitution, the Founders granted
Congress limited and enumerated powers to enact specific kinds of
municipal law for the United States as a whole.  In addition to48
limiting the kinds of laws Congress could enact, the Constitution
prescribed precise procedures for the enactment of federal laws.
According to these procedures, a bill becomes a law of the United
States only if it is passed by both houses of Congress and signed
by the President, or if two-thirds of both houses override the
President’s veto.  Because the Constitution presupposed the con-49
tinued existence of states,  the Founders recognized that the50
federal government and the states would possess some degree of
overlapping authority to regulate certain matters. Thus, in the
46. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 62, 349-50 & n.43 (2008) (explaining
how the law of nations applied in English courts in the eighteenth century insofar as English
law incorporated it).
47. See Richard C. Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the American Colonies, 30
AM. L. REG. 553, 554 (1882) (“[T]he presumption in every case is, that the common law is the
same in [America] as it was in [England].”).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
49. Id. art. I, § 7.
50. See id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
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United States—unlike in England—two sources of municipal law
could operate at the same time in the same territory.
Given this concurrent authority to adopt municipal law, the
Founders recognized the need for a mechanism to resolve the con-
flicts such authority would produce. After rejecting proposals to
authorize military force or a congressional negative on state laws,
the Founders ultimately adopted the Supremacy Clause to perform
this function. The Clause recognizes three sources of federal law as
“the supreme Law of the Land,” and expressly directs state judges
to apply such law notwithstanding contrary state law:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.51
The Clause performs the essential function of elevating one form of
municipal law (supreme federal law) above another form of munici-
pal law (state law) in both state and federal courts. Article III
reinforces the Supremacy Clause by authorizing Congress to confer
both appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to review state
court determinations of federal law and original jurisdiction on
lower federal courts to hear cases “arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority.”  In the absence of such supreme52
federal law, however, the negative implication of the Supremacy
Clause requires federal (and state) courts to apply state law.
The adoption of the Constitution also resulted in two sets of
courts—one state and one federal—capable of applying both general
and local law in appropriate cases. The Founders drafted several
51. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
52. Id. art. III, § 2. For extended treatment of the histories of the Supremacy and Arising
Under Clauses, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under”
Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 292-317 (2007) (discussing the Arising Under Clause); Clark,
supra note 6, at 1346-55 (discussing the Supremacy Clause); James S. Liebman & William F.
Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of
Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 702-73 (1998) (discussing the Supremacy and
Arising Under Clauses).
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provisions of Article III to grant federal courts power to hear cases
likely to implicate the general law of nations.  For example, Article53
III authorizes federal courts to hear controversies “between Citizens
of different States” and controversies between “Citizens of a State
and foreign Citizens or Subjects.”  At the time, such cases fre-54
quently involved merchants from different states and nations.
Because mercantile transactions were governed by the general law
merchant, the Founders did not expect that a change of forum in
such cases would result in a change in the applicable law. Rather,
they merely assumed that adjudication by independent federal
courts would reassure out-of-state merchants that their cases would
be handled fairly.
B. Judicial Adherence to the Distinction
At least until Swift, state and federal courts understood—and
tried to adhere to—the traditional distinction between local and
general law. This meant that, in matters governed by local law,
federal courts applied state statutes and local state customs having
the force of law. In matters governed by general law, state and
federal courts alike exercised independent judgment to ascertain
and apply general law.  Neither state nor federal courts considered55
themselves bound by the others’ interpretations of general law
because both sets of courts “considered themselves to be deciding
questions under a general law merchant that was neither distinc-
tively state nor federal.”56
This Section examines judicial application of general law and
local law from the time of the Founding through the Supreme
Court’s 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson. The Erie Court character-
ized Swift as holding 
that federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of
diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general jurispru-
dence, apply the unwritten law of the State as declared by its
highest court; that they are free to exercise an independent
53. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 15, at 37-39.
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
55. See infra Part I.B.2.
56. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1554.
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judgment as to what the common law of the State is—or should
be.57
 
This characterization of Swift has long been a standard account in
federal courts cases and scholarship, but it is exaggerated and
inaccurate because it conflates the distinct concepts of general law
and common law. It also equates the content of general law with the
decision of a state court ascertaining its content. As explained, the
common law included both general and local law.  While federal58
courts deferred to state court decisions on questions of local law at
the time of Swift, they did not defer to state court decisions ascer-
taining the content of general law. Thus, this account mis-
characterizes Swift as holding that federal courts may exercise
independent judgment about all forms of common law. Swift in-
volved a relatively routine application of general commercial law,
but expressly denied that federal courts had power to exercise
independent judgment regarding the content of local state law,
whether written or unwritten. The Court did not consider itself
“free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the common
law of the State ... should be.”  Rather, the Court applied its best59
understanding of general law because the state itself had no local
law governing the issue and looked instead to general commercial
law to provide a rule of decision.
To place Swift in context, this Part examines how federal courts
adhered to the distinction between general and local law in com-
mercial cases in the decades preceding Swift—and indeed in Swift
itself. It is important to consider early federal court decisions in
light of this distinction and the acts of Congress that governed such
cases. The Process Act of 1792 instructed federal courts to employ
state forms and modes of proceeding in actions at law, subject to
appropriate revisions by federal courts.  Accordingly, federal courts60
57. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
58. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
59. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
60. The Process Act of 1792, enacted after the interim Process Act of 1789, provided that 
the forms of writs, executions and other process, except their style and the forms
and modes of proceeding in suits in those of common law shall be the same as
are now used in the said courts respectively in pursuance of the act, entitled “An
act to regulate processes in the courts of the United States.”
Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. The Process Act of 1792 also established that
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often applied local state law to determine what forms of proceeding
they should follow. In addition, section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 directed federal courts to apply local state law as a rule of
decision in trials at common law where it applied.  Under this61
provision, federal courts routinely applied state law as rules of
decision in local disputes. Finally, in the absence of an applicable
federal law or a local state rule of decision, federal courts were
expected to apply general commercial law. This Part describes early
federal judicial decisions applying local state law and general
commercial law as rules of decision. Read in light of the Process Act
and section 34 of the Judiciary Act, early federal court opinions not
only adhered to the distinction between general and local law, but
also respected state authority to settle matters governed by local
law.
First, before Swift, federal courts generally adhered to the dis-
tinction between general and local law. The modern misperception
that federal courts treated all unwritten law as “ambient law” may
stem in part from the Supreme Court’s presumptive application of
common law in many cases without expressly identifying it as the
law of a particular state. This practice must be considered, however,
in light of the context in which the Court resolved these cases. All
states (except Louisiana) had adopted the common law (and by
extension general law), and initially there were relatively few
known variations in the common law from state to state —a62
circumstance exacerbated by the dearth of reported state court
decisions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Accordingly, in the absence of state court precedent to the contrary,
the Court generally presumed that state law followed the common
law of England in cases involving local matters and that general law
applied in cases involving matters traditionally subject to such law.
When reported state decisions clearly departed from English
common law or supplanted general law, however, the Court applied
the controlling state law.
in equity cases federal courts should apply the “principles, rules and usages” that govern
courts of equity, subject to residual authority to make expedient additions and alternations
to such practices. Id. The principles, rules, and usages of courts of equity could include
reference to the law merchant where it applied.
61. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
62. See Clark, supra note 6, at 1286-87 n.192.
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Second, the Supreme Court generally followed state judicial
decisions with respect to questions of local law, but not with respect
to questions of general law. In almost all cases, the Supreme Court
accepted state court interpretations of state statutes and state court
explanations of local law. The Supreme Court did not, however,
accept state court determinations of general law in the rare cases—
such as Swift—in which general law remained unsettled.  States63
did not have the power to “settle” questions of general law. In such
cases, the Court naturally exercised independent judgment to
ascertain the content of such law.
In short, taken in its full legal and historical context, Swift was
consistent with state law, relevant acts of Congress, and the con-
stitutional structure. 
1. Local Law in Federal Court
Prior to its decision in Swift, the Supreme Court often applied
state law rules of decision in cases within its jurisdiction to
commercial matters governed by local law. As explained, the Process
Act directed federal courts, as a default rule, to apply state forms of
proceeding, and section 34 required them to apply state rules of
decision in actions at law.  Although it was not always clear where64
state forms of proceeding ended and state law rules of decision
began, federal courts typically did not have to draw a sharp line
between them because Congress directed them to apply both. If a
state rule was part of a common law form of action, then the Process
Act required federal courts to apply it in actions at law unless they
exercised their residual authority to alter or add to state forms of
proceeding.  If a state law constituted a local rule of decision, then65
section 34 required federal courts to apply it as well.  In short,66
when settled state law—statutory or common law—was determina-
tive of a question in a commercial case at law, federal statutes
generally required federal courts exercising jurisdiction over the
case to apply such law.
63. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 22 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
64. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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a. State Statutes
The Supreme Court routinely applied state statutes in commer-
cial cases from the Founding until Swift. For example, in 1818 in
Lenox v. Prout, the Court applied a Maryland statute providing
“that an endorser may tender to a plaintiff the amount of a judg-
ment which he has recovered against the maker of a note, and
obtain an assignment of it.”  There was no suggestion that the67
Court was free to disregard such statutes in favor of unwritten law
of its own choosing.  To the contrary, the Court regularly applied68
67. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 520, 526 (1818).
68. The 1795 circuit court decision in United States v. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. 23 (C.C.D. Va.
1795) (No. 15,834), is illustrative of this same principle. In Mundell, a U.S. circuit court faced
the question whether the U.S. marshal may require bail in an action of debt by the United
States for a penalty under an act of Congress. Id. at 26. Although the defendant was indicted
under an act of Congress for resisting the deputy marshal, “the proceeding in question was
not a proceeding in a criminal case ... but was, in truth, a civil suit.” Id. Having found that
section 34 applied to this case, James Iredell, writing as circuit justice, proceeded to identify
what Virginia law was on this subject. He began by explaining that “the common and statute
law of England, as they existed in England at the time of the first settlement of the country,
and so far as they were applicable to its situation, were in force” in Virginia, “except in those
cases where there was a special law of the Virginia legislature itself.” Id. at 29. Justice Iredell
concluded that “under the express reference” in section 34 “to the laws of the several states,
as rules for our decision, ... the law, of Virginia, whatever it may be, concerning the requisition
of bail in actions of debt by the public upon penal statutes, is that by which we are bound to
decide on the present occasion.” Id. at 30. After examining the statute and common law of
Virginia, Justice Iredell determined that a Virginia act of assembly concerning bail was the
“rule of decision in the present case.” Id. at 31. As Michael Collins has argued, “Mundell is
strong early constitutional and statutory authority for the application of a particular state’s
statutory and common law in civil litigation in the federal courts.” Michael G. Collins, Justice
Iredell, Choice of Law, and the Constitution—A Neglected Encounter, 23 CONST. COMMENT.
163, 177 (2006).
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state statutes in commercial cases,  including statutes of frauds69 70
and statutes concerning usury.71
In addition, prior to Swift, the Court followed settled state court
interpretations of state statutes. At the time of the Founding, it may
not have been a foregone conclusion that federal courts would follow
such interpretations.  In time, however, the Marshall Court rooted72
this practice in a “universally recognized” principle that the courts
of one sovereign should accept the interpretations that another sov-
ereign’s courts gave to its own enactments.  In 1825 in Elmendorf73
v. Taylor, in applying the Kentucky courts’ settled interpretation of
a Kentucky statute, Chief Justice Marshall explained for the Court:
This Court has uniformly professed its disposition, in cases
depending on the laws of a particular State, to adopt the
construction which the Courts of the State have given to those
laws. This course is founded on the principle, supposed to be
universally recognised, that the judicial department of every
government, where such department exists, is the appropriate
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Clapp, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 125, 127-28 (1841) (explaining that the
question before the Court “depend[ed] entirely upon the statute law of Alabama,” which
provided “that every joint promissory note shall be deemed and construed to have the same
effect, in law, as a joint and several promissory note”); Evans v. Gee, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 80, 84
(1837) (“As to the damages which the court ruled the endorser in this case to be liable for, we
need only say the statute of Alabama gives them, and applies directly to the case.”);
Mandeville v. Union Bank of Georgetown, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 9, 11 (1815) (determining that
“[i]t is entirely immaterial whether this question be governed by the laws of Virginia or of
Maryland” because “[b]y neither of them can the discounts claims by the Plaintiff in error be
allowed”); Stewart v. Anderson, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 203, 205 (1810) (applying Virginia law
dealing with offsets against negotiable notes).
70. See, e.g., D’Wolf v. Rabaud, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 476, 499 (1828) (applying New York
statute of frauds); Weightman v. Caldwell, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 85, 86-89 (1819) (applying
statute of frauds); Violett v. Patton, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 142, 151-52 (1809) (applying Virginia
statute of frauds, which, the Court noted, differed in terms from the English statute, although
the difference was not material in this case); Grant v. Naylor, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 224, 229
(1808) (applying statute of frauds); Clarke v. Russel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 415, 420, 424-25 (1799)
(applying the statute of frauds, which counsel noted “is in force in Rhode-Island”).
71. See, e.g., Andrews v. Pond, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 65, 79 (1839) (holding that defense of
usury “must be determined by the laws of New York, and not by the laws of Alabama”);
Thornton v. Bank of Wash., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 36, 40 (1830) (rejecting defense of usury “within
the meaning of the statute of Maryland against usury” on the ground that the plaintiff’s
conduct was “not usury”); Gaither v. Farmers & Mechs. Bank of Georgetown, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
37, 43 (1828) (“This case is governed by the laws of Maryland: and the Act of Maryland
against usury is in the words of the Statute of Ann.”).
72. See Nelson, supra note 39, at 938-41.
73. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825).
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organ for construing the legislative acts of that government.
Thus, no Court in the universe, which professed to be governed
by principle, would, we presume, undertake to say, that the
Courts of Great Britain, or of France, or of any other nation, had
misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself into
a tribunal which should correct such misunderstanding. We
receive the construction given by the Courts of the nation as the
true sense of the law, and feel ourselves no more at liberty to
depart from that construction, than to depart from the words of
the statute.74
In other cases, the Court described its respect for state court
interpretations of state statutes as rooted in long-standing practice,
especially in cases involving land titles,  but also in cases involving75
state statutes of frauds, statutes of limitations, and commercial
regulations.  In 1829 in Beach v. Viles, the Court followed a state76
court construction of a 1795 Massachusetts statute that allowed “a
foreign attachment against garnishees, who possess goods, effects
or credits of the principal debtor.”  Writing for the Court, Justice77
Story explained that “[t]he present being a suit upon a local statute,
... the decisions which have been made upon the construction of that
statute by the state courts, are entitled to great respect; and ought
74. Id. at 159-60.
75. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 153, 168 (1827) (“[I]n construing the
statutes of a State, on which land titles depend, infinite mischief would ensue, should this
Court observe a different rule from that which has been long established in the State.”
(quoting McKeen v. Delancy’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22, 32 (1809))); McDowell v. Peyton,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 454, 461 (1825) (“[T]his Court has always conformed to that construction
of the legislative acts of a state, which has been given by its own Courts. This general
principle is entitled to peculiar consideration, when it applies to an act which regulates titles
to land.”); see also Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 58, 85 (1829) (“If this question [of the
operation of a state statute] had been settled by any judicial decision in the states where the
land lies, we should, upon the uniform principles adopted by this Court, recognise that
decision as a part of the local law.”).
76. See, e.g., Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 359-60 (1828) (explaining the English
decisions offered to prove meaning of state statute of limitations “cannot be considered as
conclusive authority, upon the construction of the statute passed by a state, upon the like
subject; for this justly belongs to the local state tribunals, whose rules of interpretation must
be presumed to be founded upon a more just and accurate view of their own jurisprudence”);
D’Wolf v. Rabaud, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 476, 501 (1828) (“What might be our own view of the
question, unaffected by any local decision, it is unnecessary to suggest; because the decisions
in New-York, upon the construction of its own statute, and the extent of the rules deduced
from it, furnish, in the present, a clear guide for this Court.”).
77. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 675, 678 (1829).
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in conformity to the uniform practice of this Court to govern our own
decisions.”78
b. Unwritten Local Law
In addition, the Supreme Court generally followed settled
unwritten state law in cases to which local law applied. At the time
of the Founding, this practice may not have been a foregone
conclusion in cases in which a federal court believed that a state
court decision mistook actual local customs.  Nonetheless, from79
early on, federal courts treated state court understandings of local
law as conclusive.  This practice both comported with “abstract80
notions of state sovereignty” and “had some very practical benefits
for the citizenry.”  The Court’s 1830 decision in Bank of the United81
States v. Tyler provides an example.  In Tyler, the Court addressed82
whether the assignee of a promissory note was obliged to pursue
redress against the drawer of the note before proceeding against an
endorser.  The Court began by observing that “[a]s this note was83
drawn, assigned, and payable in Kentucky, the obligations and
rights of the parties must depend on the laws of that state.”84
Although Kentucky statutes did not address the question before the
Supreme Court, “the courts of that state ha[d] clearly defined”—as
a matter of “local law”—that “[t]he assignee cannot maintain an
action” against the assignor until the assignee “has made use of all
due and legal diligence to recover the money from the drawer.”  The85
Court believed that this local principle—“exact[ing] such an unusual
degree of vigilance from the assignee”—was “peculiar to the juris-
prudence of Kentucky.”  Indeed, the Court noted that “no decisions86
in any state ... have extended the rule of diligence so far.”  Nonethe-87
less, the Court concluded that
78. Id.
79. See Nelson, supra note 39, at 938-41.
80. See id. at 938-39.
81. Id. at 941.
82. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 366 (1830).
83. Id. at 380.
84. Id. at 380.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 382.
87. Id.
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[t]hese rules are the law of the case; and although in our opinion
they carry the doctrine of diligence to an extent unknown to the
principles of the common law, or the law of other states, where
bonds, notes, and bills are assignable, we must adopt them as
the guide to our judgment.  88
The Court concluded that “it is not an open question, whether these
principles shall be respected by this court,” and did not “feel author-
ised to depart from them in a case to which their application cannot
be questioned.”89
2. General Commercial Law in Federal Court
From the Founding through the Swift decision, state and federal
courts alike understood the law merchant—or general commercial
law—to govern commercial disputes in the absence of a state statute
or fixed customary practice establishing a local rule of decision to
the contrary. Scholars have long pondered the origins and develop-
ment of the medieval law merchant as a general body of customary
laws.  By the time of the Founding, however, judges and other90
public officials in England and the United States understood the law
merchant as a body of customary rules incorporated by the common
law.
State courts routinely applied the general law merchant in
commercial cases as part of their common law, unless local law
superseded it. State courts understood the law merchant to be a
transnational, rather than local, body of customary law. As the
Supreme Court of New York explained in Woodworth v. Bank of
America, “[t]he Law Merchant relative to bills of exchange and
88. Id. Thus, the Court explained, “[t]he law of Kentucky has given this effect to
assignments of notes under the statute of that state; and as the plaintiffs cannot sustain this
action in their own name without the aid of the law, they must submit to the conditions which
the settled judgments on the action have imposed on them.” Id. at 385. Additionally, the Court
explained, even “[i]f the law merchant were to govern,” instead of Kentucky common law, still
“the plaintiff would be without remedy.” Id. at 384. Were the plaintiff to sue “as the indorser
of a negotiable note,” invoking the law merchant, “[t]he diligence exacted of him is quite as
extreme, if not more so, as when he sues as assignee.” Id.
89. Id. at 391.
90. See, e.g., J.H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295 (1979); Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 1153 (2012).
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endorsed notes, and commercial paper generally, is not the law of
this state only, but of all the states of the Union, and of all the
commercial nations of Europe.”  This meant that state courts91
looked to precedents from multiple jurisdictions and exercised
independent judgment to determine the precise content of general
commercial law. In most cases, state courts applied general com-
mercial law rules that they considered to be well established across
jurisdictions. In cases of doubt, however, state courts exercised
independent judgment on questions of general law.
State courts consulted treatises, English cases, other state court
cases, and federal court cases in discerning rules of the general
commercial law, but they did not consider any of these sources to be
authoritative. Rather, they consulted these sources as evidence of
customary multijurisdictional commercial law. In 1806, Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals Judge Spencer Roane nicely captured
this sentiment. He explained that as “the greatest Judges who ever
sat in England have often consulted eminent jurists and merchants
on the continent, in relation to” the law merchant, so “we avail
ourselves of the testimony of eminent writers on those subjects,
though clothed with no authority whatsoever.”  In addition, he92
described English judicial decisions “as affording evidence of the
opinions of eminent Judges as to the doctrines in question, who
have at least as great opportunities to form correct opinions as we
have.”  Although English cases were evidence of general law, the93
Virginia courts did not consider themselves bound by them.94
Likewise, although state courts consulted decisions of other state
courts on general commercial law, state courts did not consider
themselves bound by such decisions.95
91. 19 Johns. 391, 416 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821).
92. Baring v. Reeder, 1 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 154, 162 (1806) (emphasis omitted).
93. Id.; see also N.Y. Fireman Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 14 Johns. 46, 62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816)
(consulting English and state cases as evidence of “the true exposition of the law” on a point
of general commercial law); Walden v. LeRoy, 2 Cai. 263, 265-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
(consulting English cases and foreign writers as evidence of the content of general commercial
law).
94. See, e.g., Bourke v. Granberry, 21 Va. (Gilmer) 16, 25 (1820) (“It is not new for this
court to differ from the courts of England, on questions of general law.”).
95. See, e.g., Southard v. Steele, 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 435, 438 (1826) (describing a
Pennsylvania decision on the law merchant as “not obligatory upon us, yet ... entitled to
respect”); Hixon v. Reed, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 174, 177 (1822) (describing New York decisions on
“commercial subjects” as “not obligatory on this court” but “entitled to high respect”); Houston
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Like state courts, federal courts applied general commercial law
in the absence of local rules of decision, and exercised independent
judgment to determine its content. English courts applied general
commercial law because the common law incorporated such law as
part of the municipal law of England. Federal courts did not have
any need to address explicitly whether they were applying general
law as state municipal law (incorporated as part of state common
law) or as some other form of law. There are certain indications,
however, that early federal courts assumed that general commercial
law applied in federal court by virtue of state incorporation of such
law. One indication is that federal courts understood states to pos-
sess authority to displace general commercial law with local law.
For example, prior to Swift, Justice Story considered himself bound
to apply a local state law deviation from the general commercial
law.  If a state court’s decision to replace general commercial law96
with local law was binding on federal courts, federal courts may also
have considered themselves bound to apply general law because the
state had adopted general law as the governing rule of decision. In
Swift itself, the Supreme Court applied general commercial law only
after noting that New York courts applied general rather than local
law to decide the issue before the Court.  Moreover, neither federal97
nor state courts considered federal decisions on matters of general
law to be binding in state court even after Swift, when federal courts
expanded general law and disregarded local law with increasing
frequency. Indeed, it was this growing disparity between the law
applied in federal and state courts that gave rise to the “injustice
and confusion” described in Erie.98
Regardless of whether federal courts applied general commercial
law as state law or as another form of law, the important point for
v. New England Ins. Co., 22 Mass. (22 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827) (refusing to “adopt the decision in
Virginia as the law merchant” because the law was “otherwise settled in England and New
York, both of which communities are of the highest commercial character”).
96. See Halsey v. Fairbanks, 11 F. Cas. 295, 297 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 5964); see infra
notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. It is true that Swift interpreted the
phrase “laws of the several states” in section 34 of the Judiciary Act to refer only to local state
law, such as state statutes and fixed local usages. That interpretation, however, does not
foreclose the possibility that the Court applied general law as a consequence of state
incorporation of the common law (including general commercial law) as state municipal law.
98. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938).
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present purposes is that, well before Swift, federal courts routinely
applied general commercial law as a rule of decision unless state
law displaced or opted out of it.  Indeed, Justice Story—the author99
of Swift—unremarkably applied general commercial law on behalf
of the Court in the years preceding Swift. In 1825 in Bank of the
United States v. Bank of Georgia, the Bank of the United States
presented notes to the Bank of Georgia that had been issued by the
latter but were “fraudulently altered” while in circulation.  The100
Bank of Georgia accepted the notes before discovering the forgery
several days later.  The question before the Court was whether the101
Bank of Georgia should bear the loss when both parties were
equally innocent of the forgery.  Justice Story first considered102
99. The Supreme Court’s 1807 decision in French’s Executrix v. Bank of Columbia provides
a typical example. The Court considered whether an accommodation endorser—one who
endorses to back the credit of another—was relieved from liability on the endorsement by the
failure of the holder of a promissory note to give the endorser notice of nonpayment by the
maker. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 141, 153 (1807). Chief Justice Marshall began his opinion for the
Court by reciting “the general rule of law” that “the omission ... to give notice to the indorser
that payment has been refused, discharges the indorser.” Id. He then considered whether this
rule applied in “the case of an indorser of a promissory note for the accommodation of the
maker.” Id. at 154. After examining the reason of the rule and a number of English cases
addressing it, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that “[i]n point of reason, justice, and the
nature of the undertaking, there is no case in which the indorser is better entitled to demand
strict notice than in the case of an indorsement for accommodation.” Id. at 164.
The Court similarly relied on general commercial law in considering many cases involving
the notice due to makers and endorsers of promissory notes and bills of exchange. See, e.g.,
Dickens v. Beal, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 572, 581 (1836) (“Where the parties do not reside in the
same place, diligence consists in sending notice by the first mail, of the day of protest.”); Bank
of the U.S. v. Carneal, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 543, 551 (1829) (considering “what is due diligence in
respect to notice to indorsers”); Bank of the U.S. v. Corcoran, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 121, 131 (1829)
(addressing “whether such notice was given of the non-payment of the note on which this suit
was brought, as the law requires to charge an indorser”); Williams v. Bank of the U.S., 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 96, 101 (1829) (applying the “general rule of law ... that, to enable the holder of a bill
of exchange, or promissory note to charge the indorser,” the holder must give the endorser
either timely notice that the maker has dishonored the bill or otherwise not paid it, or
demonstrate a sufficient excuse for failing to give such notice); Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 578, 582 (1828) (“The general rule is, that the party whose duty it is to give
notice in such cases, is bound to use due diligence in communicating such notice.”); Bussard
v. Levering, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 102, 103 (1821) (“[B]y the general law merchant, notice of non-
payment given to the drawer on the last day of grace, after a demand upon the acceptor on the
same day, ... was sufficient to charge the drawer.”); Lindenberger v. Beall, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
104, 106 (1821) (“[A]fter demand of the maker on the third day of grace, notice to the endorser
on the same day was sufficient, by the general law merchant.”).
100. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333, 340-41 (1825).
101. Id. at 341.
102. Id.
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“general considerations” of “public convenience and policy,” con-
cluding that “the receipt by a bank of forged notes, purporting to be
its own, must be deemed an adoption of them,” because a bank,
unlike the party presenting them, was “bound to know” its own
instruments.  “Passing from these general considerations,” Justice103
Story “inquire[d] how, in analogous cases, the law has dealt with
this matter.”  Justice Story identified English and American state104
cases reasoning that a bank has a duty to know its own notes.105
“Against the pressure of these authorities,” Justice Story concluded,
“there is not a single opposing case; and we must, therefore,
conclude, that both in England and America, the question has been
supposed to be at rest.”  Thus, “the defendants were bound to106
know their own notes, and having received them without objection,
they cannot now recal[l] their assent.”  The Court routinely107
applied general law in cases involving bills of exchange, promissory
notes, and other mercantile instruments.108
Like state courts, federal courts applying general law did not
consider themselves bound by judicial decisions from other jurisdic-
tions expounding the content of such law. Even if general law was
incorporated as a form of state municipal law, there was nothing
anomalous about federal courts exercising independent judgment
to ascertain its content. Unlike local law, general law was under-
stood to reflect reason and practices common to many nations.
Accordingly, whether applied by federal or state courts, general
103. Id. at 343-45.
104. Id. at 345.
105. Id. at 347-51.
106. Id. at 351-52.
107. Id. at 355-56.
108. See, e.g., Lee v. Dick, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 482, 495-96 (1836) (holding that, under the law
merchant, the plaintiffs had to give the defendant notice that they accepted his letter of
guarantee); Thornton v. Wynn, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 183, 187-88 (1827) (explaining that a “well
settled principle of the law merchant” regarding the acts of drawers or endorsers “applies with
equal force to promissory notes, which, after endorsement, partake of the character of bills
of exchange”); Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172, 183 (1818) (“[I]f any person
who endorses a bill of exchange to another, whether for value, or for the purpose of collection,
shall come to the possession thereof again, he shall be regarded, unless the contrary appear
in evidence, as the bona fide holder and proprietor of such bill.”); Coolidge v. Payson, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 66, 75 (1817) (“[A] letter written within a reasonable time before or after the date
of a bill of exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken, and promising to accept it, is,
if shown to the person who afterwards takes the bill on credit of the letter, a virtual
acceptance binding the person who makes the promise.”).
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law—by its very nature—did not require deference to the judicial
decisions of any particular sovereign. Rather, the courts of every
nation or state had the right and the responsibility to use their
independent judgment to ascertain the content of such law.109
Well before Swift, the Supreme Court did not consider itself
bound by state court decisions applying general commercial law. For
example, in 1833 in Nichols v. Fearson, the Court resolved a ques-
tion of “general mercantile interest” not according to the decisions
of any particular state but “upon what appear[ed] to us to be the
weight of authority.”  Fearson endorsed a promissory note for $101110
over to Nichols in exchange for $97 cash.  The issue was whether111
this transaction was usurious and the promissory note thus unen-
forceable.  After reviewing state court decisions from New York,112
Massachusetts, and Connecticut, the Court stated that “[u]pon a
subject of such general mercantile interest, we must dispose of the
question according to our own best judgment of the law.”  The113
Court “recollect[ed] no other case in which [it had] been called upon
to consider the effect of usury upon the contracts of parties to
negotiable paper,” and thus was “uncommitted upon the question ...
and free to decide it, as well upon reason and principle, as upon
what appears to us to be the weight of authority.”  Although the114
Court had “not ... leisure fully to explore the decisions of the states
on the question, ... as far as we have gone, the great weight of
authority is certainly in favour of the validity of the contract under
109. By analogy, when federal courts apply a state’s choice of law rules, they are not bound
to follow state courts’ understanding of foreign law that applies under such rules. In diversity
cases, federal courts apply state choice of law rules to determine which state or nation’s law
applies to a given dispute. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). But
federal courts have never suggested that they must defer to a state court’s understanding of
applicable law from another jurisdiction. For example, if a federal court sitting in New York
applies New York choice of law principles to determine that the laws of France govern a
particular dispute, the federal court has no obligation to defer to New York courts’
understanding of French law. Similarly, although federal courts applied the law merchant
because a state’s courts would apply it, federal courts did not defer to that state’s courts’
understanding of the law merchant.
110. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 108-09 (1833).
111. Id. at 103.
112. Id. at 105.
113. Id. at 108.
114. Id. at 109.
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review.”  The Court concluded, then, “upon both reason and au-115
thority,” that the promissory note was enforceable.  116
Notably, Justice Story endorsed this view as Circuit Justice in
two 1838 decisions, foreshadowing his opinion in Swift four years
later. First, in Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., Justice Story ex-
plained that a rule of decision 
being founded, not upon local law, but upon the general princi-
ples of commercial law, would be obligatory upon this court, even
if the decisions of the state court of Massachusetts were to the
contrary; for upon commercial questions of a general nature, the
courts of the United States possess the same general authority,
which belongs to the state tribunals, and are not bound by the
local decisions. They are at liberty to consult their own opinions,
guided, indeed, by the greatest deference for the acknowledged
learning and ability of the state tribunals, but still exercising
their own judgment, as to the reasons, on which those decisions
are founded.117
Similarly, in Robinson v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., Justice
Story, after addressing a question of general commercial law,
observed:
I am aware, that a rule somewhat different has been laid down
by the supreme court of Massachusetts, for whose judgments I
entertain the most unfeigned respect. But questions of a
commercial and general nature, like this, are not deemed by the
courts of the United States to be matters of local law, in which
the courts of the United States are positively bound by the
decisions of the state courts. They are deemed questions of
general commercial jurisprudence, in which every court is at
liberty to follow its own opinion, according to its own judgment
of the weight of authority and principle.118
As these opinions suggest, however, when local state enactments
or local state customs clearly established a rule at variance from the
115. Id. at 111.
116. Id. at 112.
117. 29 F. Cas. 1402, 1405 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 17,738).
118. 20 F. Cas. 1002, 1004 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 11,049) (internal citations omitted).
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general commercial law, federal courts considered themselves bound
by the local departure. Such instances were rare, but not unprece-
dented, in the years before Swift because state laws largely con-
formed to general commercial law. The general commercial law, a
branch of the law of nations, was subject to local deviations. Thus,
English courts recognized and applied local customs and usages that
supplemented or supplanted the general law merchant.  American119
courts likewise recognized that fixed local usages governed as rules
of decision even if they departed from the general law merchant,
and that the law merchant itself was not perfectly consistent from
nation to nation.  Local laws regulating forms of proceeding120
commonly provided rules of decision in cases in which the law
merchant otherwise might apply.  Like other courts, federal courts121
119. See generally TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY
NOTES, BANK-NOTES, AND INSURANCES 77-100 (1760) (listing examples of special or local
customs that operated in conjunction with, or contrary to, principles of the law merchant). For
example, local customs governed usances. See, e.g., Buckley v. Cambell, (1706) 88 Eng. Rep.
917 (Q.B.) 917 (Sir Holt C.J.) (explaining, regarding time of usances, that “he would take
notice of the custom of merchants here, but not of that at Amsterdam or Venice,” for “[i]n such
case, you must set forth the custom in your declaration”); Meggadow v. Holt, (1692) 88 Eng.
Rep. 1134 (K.B.) 1135 (“It is not necessary to shew the custom of merchants, but it is
necessary to shew how the usance shall be intended, because it varies as places do.”). Local
custom also governed, in certain instances, whether infants could bind themselves by
accepting bills of exchange. See, e.g., Williams v. Harrison, (1697) 91 Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B.) 774
(recognizing local custom in London that an infant may bind himself as an apprentice by
accepting a bill of exchange, notwithstanding that the “custom of merchants [which holds
otherwise] is part of the law of the land”).
120. See, e.g., Bank of Wash. v. Triplett, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 25, 34 (1828) (“This bill being
drawn on a person residing in Washington, and being protested for non-payment in the same
place, is, according to the law merchant, to be governed by the usage of Washington.”);
Fenwick v. Sears’s Adm’rs, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 259, 270 (1803) (“[T]he custom of merchants in
the United States differs in some respects from the custom of merchants in England.”); Brown
v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 368 (1797) (Elsworth, C.J.) (“I say the custom of merchants in
this country; for the custom of merchants somewhat varies in different countries, in order to
accommodate itself to particular courses of business, or other local circumstances.”); Thurston
v. Koch, 23 F. Cas. 1183, 1184 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,016) (Paterson, J.) (“It is, however,
evident, that the law merchant varies in different nations, and even in the same nation at
different times. The course of trade, local circumstances, commercial interests, and national
policy, induce to some variation of the rule.”); Snyder v. Findley, 1 N.J.L. 78, 79 (1791) (“[A]s
to negligence, the custom of merchants settles it in Great Britain; there is, however, no such
custom here.”); Fleming v. McClure, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 428, 432-33 (S.C. Const. Ct. 1804) (“The
law merchant, as it obtains in England, is generally speaking, the law of this country. Some
exceptions have been made, and some more may be made, which convenience and necessity
have directed, and may hereafter suggest.”).
121. See, e.g., Yeaton v. Bank of Alexandria, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 49, 52-53 (1809) (applying
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presumed that local statutory and common law rules governed even
when they conflicted with or supplanted the general commercial
law.122
Justice Story himself recognized that federal courts were bound
to follow state court decisions when they opted out of general law
and established local law in its place. For instance, in 1826 in
Halsey v. Fairbanks, Justice Story, sitting as circuit justice, ad-
dressed whether a debtor’s assignment of property to a trustee was
fraudulent as to his creditors.  Justice Story began his opinion by123
explaining:
In one sense, the present discussion may be said to depend upon
local law; in another, to depend upon general principles and
presumptions belonging to the common law, in its widest
application. So far as there may be any peculiarity in the
jurisprudence and laws of Massachusetts, which limits the
effect, or destroys the validity of general assignments, the
question is local. So far as it involves principles and presump-
Virginia act incorporating bank to determine whether the bank could sue an endorser of a
negotiable note without first suing the maker); Hinkley v. Marean, 12 F. Cas. 205, 206 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1822) (No. 6523) (“When the right exists, the remedy is to be pursued according to the
lex fori, where the suit is brought.”); Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 364-65 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1820) (No. 8269) (explaining that “remedies on contracts are to be regulated and
pursued according to the law of the place, where the action is instituted, and not by the law
of the place, where the contract is made,” and a nation “is not obliged to depart from its own
notions of judicial order, from mere comity to any foreign nation”). 
122. For example, in Slacum v. Pomery, the Court interpreted a Virginia act of assembly
that created a liability in drawers or endorsers of bills of exchange for special damages and
interest and gave an action of debt against them. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 221, 221 (1810). The
question before the Court was whether this act dispensed with the notice of protest that was
“essential in an action founded on the custom of merchants.” Id. at 225. Chief Justice
Marshall wrote for the Court that the Virginia act did not dispense with the notice
requirement because the Virginia legislature had not altered the commercial nature of the
paper at issue, which thus remained “a pure commercial transaction governed by commercial
law.” Id. This analysis presupposed that if the Virginia legislature had altered the character
of the paper, the Court would have applied the Virginia rule.
Other federal court cases proceeded on the same assumption. In The Betsy and Rhoda, the
district court recognized that “by the local law” of Massachusetts, “the acceptance of a
negotiable security for a pre-existing debt, by simple contract is generally held to be payment,
and an extinguishment of the original cause of action.” 3 F. Cas. 305, 306 (D. Me. 1840) (No.
1366). The court explained that “[t]his is not only an innovation on the common law; it is also
a departure from the general law merchant.” Id. Although the court did not apply this law
because it was sitting as a court of admiralty, it observed “that if this had been a transaction
between merchant and merchant, ... the local law ought ... to prevail.” Id.
123. 11 F. Cas. 295, 297 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 5964).
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tions of constructive fraud upon creditors, the question must
turn upon the same considerations substantially, as would
govern it in New York, Pennsylvania, or England.124
After considering the general law, Justice Story identified a
Massachusetts case, Widgery v. Haskell,  that had “been pressed125
upon the attention of the court, as containing a doctrine not entirely
consonant with the English doctrine, and establishing, in some sort,
a rule of local law.”  It is worth quoting Justice Story’s analysis of126
Widgery at length:
It is not ... my intention to go into a commentary upon the
case of Widgery v. Haskell, or to question, that it was rightly
decided upon its own circumstances. I must indeed confess, that
some of the reasoning, used by the learned chief justice on that
occasion, did not then convince my mind, and upon frequent
revisions since, I remain still unconvinced of its accuracy.... So
far, however, as it may be presumed to stand upon local law, my
duty is to follow it, and it will be performed without hesitation.
I understand, then, the case of Widgery v. Haskell to have
decided, that in Massachusetts an assignment to a trustee,
executed by a debtor bonâ fide for the benefit of creditors, is not
valid, unless the creditors are parties to, or assent to the deed.127
In sum, contrary to modern assertions that federal courts exer-
cised independent judgment over all forms of state common law,
federal courts drew an important distinction between general law
and local law. Traditionally, federal courts exercised independent
judgment only on questions of general law, and deferred to settled
state court decisions on questions of local law.
Not surprisingly, just as federal courts did not consider them-
selves bound by state court pronouncements on general law, state
courts did not consider themselves bound by Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on such law. For example, in 1830 in Thompson v.
Cumming, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia explained that
the “custom of merchants” as stated by the Supreme Court of the
124. Id.
125. 5 Mass. (5 Tyng) 144 (1809).
126. Halsey, 11 F. Cas. at 299.
127. Id. at 299-300.
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United States “does not bind us.”  Rather, the Virginia court was128
“free to follow, and ought to follow, the rule of the law merchant, as
long settled in England, and in most of the states of the Union.”129
State courts continued to exercise independent judgment on general
commercial law matters even after Swift was decided, as Part II.B
explains. Shortly after Swift, for instance, counsel urged New York’s
highest court to conform its decision “to the opinion of Mr. Justice
Story in the recent case of Swift v. Tyson.”  Although recognizing130
that on “question[s] of commercial law, ... it is desirable that there
should be, as far as practicable, uniformity of decision,” the New
York court nonetheless declined to follow the rule applied in Swift
and characterized the Supreme Court as a “tribunal, whose deci-
sions are not of paramount authority” on such questions.131
C. Swift v. Tyson in Historical Context
This background provides essential context for understanding the
Supreme Court’s decision in Swift v. Tyson.  Scholars and judges132
have long criticized Swift on two grounds. First, commentators
claim that Swift misinterpreted section 34 of the Judiciary Act by
holding that the provision only applied to state statutes and not to
unwritten state law.  Second, commentators suggest that the Swift133
Court usurped state regulatory authority by disregarding state
court precedent and applying its own conception of general commer-
cial law.  Neither critique holds up when Swift is understood in134
historical context. At the time it was decided, Swift was an unexcep-
tional opinion, using independent judgment to ascertain and apply
128. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 321, 325 (1830).
129. Id.
130. Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93, 95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
131. Id. at 95, 112.
132. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
133. See Clark, supra note 6, at 1278 (citing JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 4.1, at 192 (2d ed. 1993)); Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the
Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 132-33 (2011) (stating that the Swift “Court
interpreted the Act as requiring the application of only state statutory law, and not state
common law”).
134. See Clark, supra note 6, at 1278; see also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed
Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 431 (1995) (explaining that the Swift
doctrine raised federalism problems because it seemed “as if federal courts were exercising
the power of state legislatures”).
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general commercial law just as federal and state courts had done in
numerous cases before it. Swift was different only insofar as the
Supreme Court disagreed with the apparent understanding of
general commercial law by the courts of New York—the state with
local authority over the transaction. Although such disagreements
were rare, they were always possible when a federal court exercised
independent judgment to ascertain applicable principles of general
law. This was the nature of general law.
In Swift, Tyson bought land from speculators, Norton and Keith,
using a bill of exchange.  The speculators in turn gave Swift the135
negotiable instrument to satisfy a debt they owed Swift.  When136
Swift sought payment on the instrument from Tyson, Tyson refused
to pay on the ground that the speculators had fraudulently induced
him to buy land that the speculators did not own.  If the Court137
found that Swift gave valuable consideration and was a bona fide
holder of the instrument, then Tyson had no defense against him.
Whether Swift was entitled to payment turned on whether release
of a preexisting debt was valid consideration for the note. As Justice
Story explained for the Court, “the only real question in the cause
is, whether, under the circumstances of the present case, such a
preexisting debt constitutes a valuable consideration in the sense of
the general rule applicable to negotiable instruments.”138
Before resolving this question, the Court had to ascertain the
source of the applicable law. Tyson argued that the Court should
treat the transaction “as a New York contract, and therefore to be
governed by the laws of New York, as expounded by its Courts, as
well upon general principles,” in accordance with section 34 of the
Judiciary Act.  Tyson “further contended, that by the law of New139
York, as thus expounded by its Courts, a pre-existing debt does not
constitute, in the sense of the general rule, a valuable consideration
applicable to negotiable instruments.”  Justice Story assumed that140
New York courts held this view of the general law, but he concluded
that the Supreme Court was not bound to follow the New York
135. Swift, 41 U.S. at 14-15.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 15.
138. Id. at 16.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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courts’ understanding “if it differs from the principles established in
the general commercial law.”  The Swift Court made three impor-141
tant points in the course of deciding the case.
First, the Court stressed that the question to be decided was one
of general law rather than local law, and that local law could be
written or unwritten. According to the Court, local state law
extended only “to the positive statutes of the state, and the construc-
tion thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles
to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles
to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in
their nature and character.”  “[Q]uestions of a more general na-142
ture,” by contrast, are “not at all dependent upon local statutes or
local usages of a fixed and permanent operation,” but include “ques-
tions of general commercial law, where the state tribunals are called
upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain
upon general reasoning and legal analogies, ... what is the just rule
furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case.”143
Indeed, the Court went out of its way to emphasize that New York
state courts themselves understood the question before the Court as
one of general law rather than local law. As the Court put it, “[i]t is
observable that the Courts of New York do not found their decisions
upon this point upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient
local usage: but they deduce the doctrine from the general principles
of commercial law.”  144
Second, the Court rejected the contention that section 34 of the
Judiciary Act requires federal courts to follow state court decisions
on questions of general law. Section 34 provided “[t]hat the laws of
the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes
of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply.”  The Court145
denied that the statute’s reference to “the laws of the several states”
included the decisions of state courts. Echoing Blackstone, the Court
first remarked that such decisions “are, at most, only evidence of
141. Id. at 18-19.
142. Id. at 18.
143. Id. at 18-19.
144. Id. at 18.
145. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
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what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws.”  According to146
the Court, “[t]he laws of a state are more usually understood to
mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative
authority thereof, or long established local customs having the force
of laws.”  Although federal courts had long deferred to state court147
decisions interpreting state enactments or applying local state
customary law, federal courts had never deferred to state court
understandings of general commercial law. Because state courts did
not understand themselves to be fixing the content of general law
unilaterally, their decisions were mere evidence of the content of
such law.
The Court’s discussion of this point clearly contradicts conven-
tional accounts that Swift (mis)interpreted section 34 to apply to
state statutes, but not to unwritten state law. In fact, the crucial
distinction drawn by the Court was not between written and
unwritten law at all, but between general and local law, whether
written or unwritten. Thus, the Court explained that 
the true interpretation of the thirty-fourth section limited its
application to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the
positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof
adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things
having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real
estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their
nature and character.  148
In other words, the Court read section 34 to apply not only to local
statutes but also to “local customs having the force of laws” or “local
usages of a fixed and permanent nature,”  the meaning and149
146. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18. In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that the decisions
of courts “are often reexamined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves, whenever
they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect.” Id. 
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 18-19. Counsel for Tyson, Richard Dana, in arguing that the Supreme Court
must follow New York court decisions on the issue before the Court, cited five cases for the
proposition “[t]hat the provisions of the thirty-fourth section are not confined to ‘statutes.’”
Id. at 14. Each of these cases, however, involved a question of local law, not general law. See
Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 295-99 (1832) (following state court construction
of a state statute); Henderson v. Griffin, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 151, 157 (1831) (determining, in a
case involving real property, that “[t]hese are the views which inevitably result from the local
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content of which state court decisions conclusively fixed as far as
federal courts were concerned. 
Conversely, the Court denied that section 34 
did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more
general nature; not at all dependent upon local statutes or local
usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for example, to
the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instru-
ments, and especially to questions of general commercial law.150
Given the nature of general law, this conclusion was hardly novel or
surprising. At the time, judges did not regard any one sovereign as
having the authority to fix the content of general law for other
sovereigns. Although “the decisions of the local tribunals upon such
subjects are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate atten-
tion and respect of this Court[,] they cannot furnish positive rules,
or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments are to be
bound up and governed.”  Rather, “[t]he law respecting negotiable151
instruments may be truly declared ... to be in a great measure, not
the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.”152
laws, expounded by the highest court in the state”); Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 153,
162 (1827) (“applying the rule which has uniformly governed this Court, that where any
principle of law, establishing a rule of real property, has been settled in the State Courts, the
same rule will be applied by this Court that would be applied by the State tribunals”); United
States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 749 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (Story, Circuit J.)
(stating that section 34’s “true exposition is, that the rights of persons and rules of property,
as settled in the states, shall be guides to the courts of the United States in controversies
depending before such courts[,] [a]s, for instance, the mode of conveying real estate by deed
or by will, the right in cases of intestacy of the heirs, in the descent and distribution of
estates” (internal citation omitted)); Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062, 1063-64 (C.C.D.
R.I. 1812) (No. 16,871) (determining applicability of a state insolvency statute). 
150. Swift, 41 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).
151. Id. Thomas Fessenden, counsel for Swift, argued to the Court:
In cases in which the Courts of the United States have jurisdiction, by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, the common mercantile law of the
respective states applying to and governing those cases, is as much submitted
to the actual consciences and judgments of the minds of the judges who
constitute those courts, to be considered and declared, without respect to the
decision of any state Court, as binding authority, as the same law, in cases
where the United States Courts have not jurisdiction, is to the best judgment of
the state Courts, without respect to the decision of any Court of the United
States, as binding authority.
Id. at 9.
152. Id. at 19. On this point, Fessenden argued to the Court that 
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Third, because the question in Swift was one of general law to
which section 34 did not apply, the Court concluded that federal
courts—no less than state courts—were free to use their independ-
ent judgment to ascertain the content of the applicable law. With
respect to “questions of general commercial law,” Justice Story
explained that 
the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions
as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and
legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or
instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles
of commercial law to govern the case.153
In performing this function, the Court examined both reason and
authority.  “[W]hy upon principle,” the Court asked, “should not a154
pre-existing debt be deemed such a valuable consideration?”  As a155
matter of reason, 
[i]t is for the benefit and convenience of the commercial world to
give as wide an extent as practicable to the credit and circula-
tion of negotiable paper, that it may pass not only as security for
new purchases and advances, made upon the transfer thereof,
but also in payment of and as security for pre-existing debts.  156
The more restrictive doctrine allegedly embraced by New York
courts “would strike a fatal blow at all discounts of negotiable
securities for pre-existing debts.”  As a matter of judicial authority,157
the Court explained, the overwhelming weight of decisions was that
a preexisting debt constituted a valuable consideration. Because
this was a question of general law, the Court canvassed a wide
range of sources, including its prior opinions, English decisions,
[i]f there is any question of law, not local, but widely general in its nature and
effects, it is the present question. It is one in which foreigners, the citizens of
different states, in their contests with each other, nay, every nation of the
civilized commercial world, are deeply interested.
Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 19.
154. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (describing this general practice).
155. Swift, 41 U.S. at 20.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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treatises, and the decisions of American state courts.  On the basis158
of this review, the Court had “no hesitation” in concluding “that a
pre-existing debt does constitute a valuable consideration in the
sense of the general rule already stated, as applicable to negotiable
instruments.”159
In context, Swift v. Tyson was not a path-breaking case. Rather,
it followed a long line of cases applying general law in federal court.
Tellingly, in the years that immediately followed, courts did not cite
Swift for the proposition that federal courts sitting in diversity could
apply general law because that proposition was unremarkable.
Rather, they cited it as authority merely for the specific principle of
general law that it endorsed.  Courts certainly did not cite Swift160
in those years for the extravagant claim that federal courts could
exercise independent judgment over all forms of state common law,
be it general law or local law. Swift merely signaled that federal
courts would apply general law when state courts would apply
general law, and that federal courts would exercise independent
judgment as to the content of such law, just as state courts would.
Because New York courts applied general law rather than any local
New York statute or custom to decide the question in Swift, neither
the Constitution nor early acts of Congress imposed any impediment
to the application of general law in federal court.
II. THE BREAKDOWN OF GENERAL AND LOCAL LAW
In the decades following Swift, the evolving Swift doctrine became
increasingly inconsistent with the constitutional structure and acts
of Congress. As discussed below, states increasingly exercised their
regulatory power to localize matters they were previously content
to have governed by general commercial law. At the same time,
federal courts improperly expanded their conception of general law
beyond commercial law to include matters traditionally subject to
local law. These two developments ultimately led the Supreme
Court to declare the Swift doctrine unconstitutional in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins. 
158. Id. at 20-22.
159. Id. at 19.
160. See Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1514 (“Swift appears to have been regarded when it
was decided as little more than a decision on the law of negotiable instruments.”).
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A. State Efforts to Localize General Law
After Swift, states increasingly localized matters previously
subject to general law, abandoning “reliance on the general law
merchant in favor of localized commercial doctrines.”  Both state161
legislatures and state courts participated in this shift.  State162
legislatures enacted commercial statutes to replace general com-
mercial law, and state courts increasingly regarded commercial law
as local law rather than general law.
First, state legislatures steadily subjected commercial transac-
tions to state legislation, eventually including uniform commercial
laws. By the late nineteenth century, commercial transactions in the
United States were subjected to various and often contradictory
state statutory requirements.  At this time, “statutes grew and163
increased like weeds in all the forty-eight states and territories.”164
Indeed, “every state ... had one or more statutes attempting to
regulate in whole, or in part, the law of commercial paper.”165
Because “[b]ills and notes were the oil for running the American
business machine, ... [c]ourts were clogged with questions of
negotiability and transfer.”  Disuniformity in state law necessi-166
tated the development of uniform commercial statutes,  including167
161. See Clark, supra note 6, at 1293; see also id. at 1290.
162. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 355 (1973) (“[E]ach state
from Maine to the Pacific was a petty sovereignty, with its own brand of law.”); Lyman D.
Brewster, The Promotion of Uniform Legislation, 6 YALE L.J. 132, 140 (1897) (arguing for
“statutory unity rather than diversity, in matters of common interest”). Many changes in
commercial law were due to the enactment of specialized statutes by state legislatures. See
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & JOHN HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 5 (4th
ed. 1985) (“By 1890 every state had at least one statute on negotiable instruments.”).
163. See TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 123 (1979) (describing the need “to bring some uniformity to the tangled
local law”); Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff:
The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 367 (1983)
(describing “the confusion in the law of bills and notes”); Frederick K. Beutel, The
Development of State Statutes on Negotiable Paper Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law,
40 COLUM. L. REV. 836, 849 (1940) (describing the multiplicity of state commercial statutes).
164. Beutel, supra note 163, at 849.
165. Id.
166. Bane, supra note 163, at 367. “In the Century Edition of the American Digest, covering
cases up to 1896, the subject of bills and notes took up virtually one entire volume of more
than 2,700 pages.” Id.
167. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 162, at 355 (“By 1900, ... [the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law] had been widely enacted.”).
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the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.  Such laws were168
designed to perform the function historically performed by the law
merchant—that is, to encourage trade by subjecting commercial
transactions to uniform rules across state lines.  By adopting the169
Negotiable Instruments Act, which codified many law merchant
rules, states incorporated much of general commercial law into their
local enacted laws.
State legislation, however, did not entirely displace general
commercial law. The Negotiable Instruments Act itself expressly
stated that “[i]n any case not provided for in this act the rules of ...
the law merchant shall govern.”  Nonetheless, over time, general170
law grew less uniform as state and federal courts increasingly
defined it differently.  Moreover, state courts increasingly came to171
describe their distinctive interpretations of the law merchant as
local state law, not general commercial law. In particular, state
courts began to dispute whether, in applying the law merchant, they
were bound to follow the law of the forum or the law of the place of
the contract. State courts thus began to describe general commercial
law not as a transnational law over which they exercised independ-
ent judgment but rather as the local law of a particular sovereign.
Eventually, state courts no longer characterized even the question
involved in Swift v. Tyson—whether a negotiable instrument invalid
in the hands of the original holder was enforceable by a bona fide
holder in due course—as a question of general law, but rather
characterized it as one of local law.  Under this view, local law172
governed the content of commercial law. By the turn of the twenti-
eth century, 
168. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONS FOR THE PROMOTION OF UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
8 (1896). In addition to this act, states widely accepted uniform acts on sales (1906),
warehouse receipts (1906), bills of lading (1909), and stock transfers (1909). Bane, supra note
163, at 369.
169. See Brewster, supra note 162, at 134 (“[G]reat care is taken to preserve the use of
words which have had repeated legal constructions and become recognized terms in the Law
Merchant.”).
170. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT § 196, 5 U.L.A. 724 (1943).
171. See Bellia, supra note 7, at 891 (explaining how general law grew less uniform);
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1267 (1985)
(describing the lack of uniformity that developed in general law).
172. Comment, What Law Governs the Question of Purchase for Value of Negotiable
Instruments, 27 YALE L.J. 246, 246 (1917).
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the rule adopted in a large majority of the state courts, and
announced by text-writers, is that when it becomes necessary to
determine the common law of another state, the decisions of the
courts of final resort of that state will be followed, regardless of
precedents to the contrary in the state where the trial is held,
and that this rule applies to the law merchant, as well as to
other branches of the common law.  173
Thus, state courts came to treat the law merchant as local law, not
general law.
If federal courts had merely persisted in treating unwritten
commercial law as general law in the face of these developments,
the Erie problem—federal judicial interference with state regulatory
authority—would have been confined to a relatively small enclave.
By the early twentieth century, states had codified much of the
general commercial law and, with a few exceptions,  federal courts174
followed state statutes on commercial questions. In 1934, the
Supreme Court settled that federal courts must follow state court
interpretations of state statutes, including uniform state legislation
codifying general law.  Thus, state statutory localization of general175
commercial law increasingly prevented federal courts from exercis-
ing independent judgment over commercial disputes even before
Erie was decided.  Federal courts, however, did not confine their176
application of the Swift doctrine to commercial law. Rather, they
broadly expanded their conception of general law throughout the
173. Sykes v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of Des Moines, 98 P. 206, 207 (Kan. 1908); see also
Comment, What Law Governs the Defenses to a Negotiable Instrument in the Hands of a Bona
Fide Holder for Value, 37 YALE L.J. 803, 804-05 (1928) (explaining that although “the Federal
courts and some state courts have taken the attitude that both the character of the holder as
a holder in due course and the defenses available present a question of the general
commercial law as interpreted by the forum,” the “great majority of state courts” determine
such questions “by the law governing [the] contract contained in the bill or note” (internal
citation omitted)); Comment, supra note 172, at 246-47 (arguing that “[i]f the law of a
particular state is applicable under the rules of the Conflict of Laws of the forum, there is no
good reason why these rules should be set aside when the matter in question is one of common
law or of general commercial law”).
174. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
175. Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487, 493-95 (1934).
176. See Charles A. Heckman, Uniform Commercial Law in the Nineteenth Century Federal
Courts: The Decline and Abuse of the Swift Doctrine, 27 EMORY L.J. 45, 51 (1978) (arguing that
“[a]s a commercial doctrine, Swift was rendered superfluous” by uniform commercial
legislation).
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late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to include such
traditionally local matters as torts, punitive damages, and real
property rights. By generalizing traditional areas of local state
regulation—and thereby subjecting them to rules independently
determined by federal courts—the Swift doctrine significantly
expanded federal judicial interference with state governance au-
thority in diversity cases.
B. Federal Judicial Efforts to Generalize Local Law
While states localized general law after Swift, federal courts
increasingly generalized traditional areas of local law. In Erie, the
Supreme Court decried the “broad province” that federal courts had
“accorded to the so-called ‘general law’ over which federal courts
exercised an independent judgment.”  The Erie Court noted that177
federal courts had come to apply general law to purely intrastate
contracts, questions of tort liability (even concerning real property
rights), rights to recover certain kinds of damages, and the construc-
tion of instruments conveying property rights —all of which were178
local matters subject to state governance at the time of Swift. One
of the earliest and most significant steps in this expansion was the
Court’s 1862 decision in Chicago v. Robbins to disregard state tort
law in favor of so-called “general law.”  The case involved liability179
for negligence, and the Court declared that “where private rights
are to be determined by the application of common law rules alone,
this Court, although entertaining for State tribunals the highest
respect, does not feel bound by their decisions.”  Three decades180
177. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938). In addition, federal courts came to
exercise independent judgment in many cases over unsettled questions of local state law. See
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33 (1883) (explaining that where state courts have not
settled matters of local state law, “it is the right and duty of the Federal courts to exercise
their own judgment; as they always do in reference to the doctrines of commercial law and
general jurisprudence”); see also Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 373 (1893)
(explaining that “[s]ince the case of Burgess v. Seligman the same proposition has been again
and again affirmed”).
178. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75-76; see also Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1928) (describing how federal courts
decided various matters according to general law, including the construction of insurance
policies, construction of deeds, and questions of tort law).
179. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 428-29 (1862).
180. Id.
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later, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh, the Court deter-
mined that the question whether a railroad was responsible for the
negligence of one employee against another was 
not a question of local law, to be settled by an examination
merely of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, ... but
rather one of general law, to be determined by a reference to all
the authorities, and a consideration of the principles underlying
the relations of master and servant.181
 
In dissent, Justice Field famously invoked the Constitution to reject
this expansion of general law. According to Field, “there stands, as
a perpetual protest against [the federal courts’ expansion of general
law] the Constitution of the United States, which recognizes and
preserves the autonomy and independence of the States” to regulate
local matters in the absence of a valid conflicting federal law.  182
Federal courts nonetheless continued to expand the concept of
general law leading up to Erie. Scholars noted this expansion while
it was occurring,  at the time Erie was decided,  and in the183 184
decades that followed.  By 1938, federal courts claimed the right185
to exercise independent judgment over dozens of historically local
181. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 149 U.S. at 370.
182. Id. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., H. Parker Sharp & Joseph Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson Since 1900, 4 IND. L.J. 367, 370-82 (1929) (describing federal courts’ application of
general law to questions involving commercial paper, simple contracts, insurance, corpo-
rations, torts, real property, personal property, damages measures, conflict of laws, evidence,
and other matters).
184. See, e.g., Harold M. Bowman, The Unconstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18
B.U. L. REV. 659, 663 (1938) (explaining that after Swift general law came to embrace “torts
against both persons and property, and even some aspects of title to real estate”); Robert H.
Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 548, 611-13 (1938) (describing the
expansion of the Swift doctrine).
185. See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 163, at 81-82 (describing federal judicial expansion of
general law after Swift); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 51-52 (2000) (explaining that by the end of the nineteenth
century, federal courts “had inflated the domain of general jurisprudence to encompass most
common law subjects”); Marian O. Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent,
40 TEX. L. REV. 509, 510 (1962) (explaining the expansion of general law after Swift); Clark,
supra note 6, at 1294 (“[F]ederal courts simultaneously expanded the Swift doctrine well
beyond its commercial law origins to encompass numerous questions traditionally governed
by local law.”).
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law questions including negligence, punitive damages, and property
rights.  State courts had never understood general law to govern186
such matters in the way that general law governed commercial
disputes. Moreover, certain federal courts even went so far as to
announce narrow, but important, exceptions to the traditional rule
that they must follow settled state court interpretations of state
statutes.187
Even as federal courts generalized local law in diversity cases,
state courts continued to apply local state law.  When state courts188
ruled in accordance with Supreme Court determinations of general
law, they professed to do so not out of obligation but because they
either agreed with such determinations or accepted them as a
matter of comity.  On many occasions, however, state courts chose189
to adhere to their own conceptions of local and general law. The
resulting divergence between the law applied in state and federal
courts gave rise to the “political and social” defects famously
described by the Court in Erie.  These defects consisted of a lack190
of uniformity in state and federal courts on questions of “general
law,”  uncertainty regarding the line between general and local191
law,  and “discrimination result[ing] from the wide range of192
persons held entitled to avail themselves of the federal rule by
186. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1938) (describing the expansion of
the Swift doctrine).
187. For instance, federal courts held that they did not have to follow changes in state court
interpretations in cases in which the alleged rights vested before the changed interpretation,
see Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205-06 (1863); that they could exercise
independent judgment in construing state statutes in cases that arose before the first state
court interpretation, see Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 35 (1883); and that they could
exercise independent judgment in construing statutes that incorporated general law
principles, see Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 290 F. 505, 509 (E.D. Okla. 1923). The latter
decision provoked significant controversy. See, e.g., J.B. Fordham, The Federal Courts and the
Construction of Uniform State Laws, 7 N.C. L. REV. 423, 428 (1929) (arguing that “the doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson should not be applied in the construction of uniform state laws”).
188. See Bellia, supra note 7, at 898-901.
189. See id. at 898-99. In some cases, federal courts went even further and federalized local
law questions based on a broad reading of a federal statute. See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. Prescott,
240 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1916) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act “manifest[ed] the
intent of Congress that the obligation of the carrier with respect to the services within the
purview of the statute shall be governed by uniform rule in the place of the diverse
requirements of state legislation and decisions”).
190. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
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resort to the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”  According to the193
Court, these defects demonstrated the “injustice and confusion
incident to the [Swift] doctrine.”194
Scholars have suggested various reasons for federal courts’
expansion of general law after Swift. Some have argued that federal
judicial expansion of general law was one aspect of a broader cen-
tralization of federal power after the Civil War, including by federal
courts.  In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the195
Court expanded its interpretation of the Commerce Clause and Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, increasingly holding
state economic regulations unconstitutional.  In 1867 and 1875,196
Congress expanded the removability of diversity cases from state
courts, thereby enlarging the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts
and providing more opportunities for federal courts to apply their
own expansive conceptions of general law rather than local state
law.  197
In addition to the general expansion of national regulation after
the Civil War, a shift in jurisprudential thought may have contrib-
uted to federal courts’ increased willingness to exercise independent
judgment over matters traditionally subject to local control.
Professors Randall Bridwell and Ralph Whitten have argued that
“the rise of a body of literature in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries that legitimated a process of judge-made law”
may have contributed to the federal judicial expansion of the realm
of law in which they expressly exercised independent judgment.198
193. Id. at 76.
194. Id. at 77.
195. See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 163, at 93.
196. See id. at 93-94; see also Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction
and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1305-11 (2000)
(explaining how the Court transformed general law into general constitutional law); Robert
Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can it be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1603 (2002)
(explaining that general “[f]ederal common law and federal constitutional rights were equally
policies of ‘judicial centralization’”); Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of
Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 89-90 (1997) (explaining how “the
Court self-consciously gave diversity an expansive reading to facilitate the federal courts’
resolution of federal constitutional questions”).
197. See Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71; Act of
Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552
(amended 1887 and 1888).
198. RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW:
THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM 123 (1977).
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Finally, scholars have argued that the death of Joseph Story in 1845
may have contributed to the expansion—and distortion—of the
Swift doctrine. According to Professors Bridwell and Whitten, “his
passing was bound to remove from the Court a great source of
constitutional and common law understanding.”  Whatever the199
reasons, the federal courts’ expansion of general law while state
courts localized general law meant that “an explosive clash of
sovereignties was inevitable.”200
C. Erie and the Supremacy Clause
By the time Erie was decided, the original rationale for the Swift
doctrine was largely outmoded. In 1842, Swift looked to general
commercial law when states did the same. By 1938, however, states
no longer purported to apply general law to commercial questions
(like the one in Swift), and states never understood general law to
govern tort questions (like the one in Erie). The conclusion was now
inescapable that federal courts sitting in diversity had long been
disregarding state law with no basis in supreme federal law for
doing so. Erie held that this practice violated the Constitution but
did not clearly spell out the precise grounds for this conclusion.201
Indeed, commentators continue to debate the constitutional basis
for the Court’s holding,  and some even question whether the202
Constitution was relevant to the Court’s rejection of the Swift doc-
199. Id.
200. FREYER, supra note 163, at 94.
201. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 702 (1974)
(“[The Erie opinion] has been faulted for failing to indicate precisely what constitutional
provision Swift v. Tyson’s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act violated.”). In addition
to failing to spell out precise grounds for its holding, the Erie Court mischaracterized Swift
v. Tyson, failing to distinguish the actual Swift opinion from what would develop into the
“Swift doctrine.” See supra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
202. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3, at 326 (5th ed. 2007) (“The
constitutional basis for the Erie decision has confounded scholars.”); Jack Goldsmith & Steven
Walt, Essay, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 676 (1998)
(“[Erie’s] holding has been subject to disagreement and controversy over the years.”); see also
Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (2008) (suggesting that the
constitutional grounds cited by the Erie majority and the modern application of constitutional
limits on federal common law does not bear scrutiny); Michael Steven Green, Erie’s
Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111 (2011) (explaining that Justice Brandeis’s
argument in Erie contained a suppressed constitutionally mandated nondiscrimination
principle).
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trine.  Careful review of the Court’s opinion and the Constitution,203
however, suggests that Erie is best understood as resting on the
negative implication of the Supremacy Clause.
The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.”  According to procedures specified elsewhere in the204
Constitution, each source of law recognized by the Supremacy
Clause must be enacted by multiple actors subject to the political
safeguards of federalism, including the Senate.  Amendments to205
the “Constitution” must be proposed by two-thirds of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, or by a Convention called by two-
thirds of the states, and then ratified by three-quarters of the
states.  “Laws of the United States” must pass both the House and206
the Senate, and then be presented to the President for his ap-
proval.  If the President disapproves, then a bill can only become207
a “Law” if it is approved by two-thirds of the House and Senate.208
Finally, “Treaties” can be made only by the President with the con-
currence of “two thirds of the Senators present.”  209
All of these procedures permit the federal government to override
state law only with the approval of the Senate acting in concert with
203. See Jackson, supra note 184, at 614, 644 (“[T]he Court might well have avoided resort
to statutory or constitutional grounds, and placed its decision solely on grounds of sound
practice for the Federal courts.”).
204. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
205. See Clark, supra note 6, at 1338-39; see also Wechsler, supra note 21, at 547-48 (“[T]he
Senate is intrinsically calculated to prevent intrusion from the center on subjects that
dominant state interests wish preserved for state control.”).
206. U.S. CONST. art. V. The original Constitution was proposed by a Convention voting by
states and became effective upon “the Ratification of the Conventions of nine States.” Id. art.
VII.
207. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
208. Id. Professor Henry Monaghan agrees “that, as an historical matter, ‘Laws ... made
in pursuance thereof’ referred only to Acts of Congress,” Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy
Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 740-41 (2010), but argues that because of
changed circumstances “the word ‘Laws’ in the Supremacy Clause must now be taken to in-
clude” “the commands of any institution whose lawmaking authority has been recognized over
time.” Id. at 742. Although a full examination of this claim is beyond the scope of this Article,
it seems safe to say that the Erie Court did not share Professor Monaghan’s view because it
read the Constitution to prohibit a doctrine of judicial lawmaking that had been “widely
applied throughout nearly a century.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
209. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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at least one additional actor. These procedures preserve the gov-
ernance prerogatives of the states in two related ways. First,
requiring the approval of multiple actors makes federal lawmaking
more difficult by creating the effect of a supermajority require-
ment.  Second, requiring the approval of the Senate to displace210
state law was historically understood to make excessive displace-
ment of state law less likely because the Senate was designed to
protect the states from federal overreaching.  The Swift doctrine,211
as courts came to define it, contradicted these political and proce-
dural safeguards of federalism by permitting federal courts—acting
alone—to disregard state law without any basis for doing so in “the
supreme Law of the Land.”
The underlying issue in Erie was one of tort liability within the
traditional authority of the states. While walking alongside the
railroad tracks, Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was struck by
an object protruding from a passing train.  Tompkins sued the212
railroad, a New York corporation, in federal court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship.  Tompkins’ ability to recover turned on213
what duty of care the railroad owed to pedestrians walking along
the right of way. The railroad argued that Tompkins was a tres-
passer under Pennsylvania law and “that the railroad is not liable
for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negli-
gence, unless it be wanton or willful.”  Tompkins countered that214
“the railroad’s duty and liability is to be determined in federal
courts as a matter of general law.”  The court of appeals agreed215
with Tompkins,  but the Supreme Court reversed.216 217
Without referring to the Supremacy Clause by name, the Erie
Court nonetheless made clear by paraphrasing the Clause that only
those sources of law recognized as “supreme” provide a constitu-
tional basis for disregarding state law. The Court began its constitu-
210. See Clark, supra note 6, at 1339; John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74-75 (2001).
211. See Clark, supra note 6, at 1357-67. The states have equal suffrage in the Senate and
senators were originally chosen by state legislators. Id. at 1365.
212. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 70.
215. Id. 
216. See Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
217. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
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tional analysis with the following sentence: “Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”  This sen-218
tence essentially restates the negative implication of the Supremacy
Clause.  Because the Clause recognizes only the Constitution,219
laws, and treaties of the United States as the supreme law of the
land, state law continues to govern in the absence of such law. The
Court also underscored the federal courts’ lack of constitutional
power to displace state law on their own initiative. According to the
Court, “no clause in the Constitution purports to confer ... power
upon the federal courts ... to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or
‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.”220
Applying these constitutional principles, the Erie Court rejected
the so-called Swift doctrine, and required federal courts to apply
state tort law to disputes like the one before the Court.  The Court221
emphasized that the “general law” applied by federal courts under
the Swift doctrine had become “little less than what the judge
advancing the doctrine [thought] at the time should be the general
law on a particular subject.”  Absent a governing provision of222
enacted federal law, federal judicial application of general law
rather than local state law contradicted the Supremacy Clause and
circumvented the procedural safeguards of federalism that it incor-
porates. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court felt
“compel[led]” by the Constitution to abandon the Swift doctrine and
hold that—absent a contrary provision of the “Federal Constitution”
or “Act[ ] of Congress”—federal courts must apply controlling  writ-
ten and unwritten state law in cases subject to state regulatory
authority.223
218. Id. at 78.
219. Although the Court left out any reference to treaties, there is no reason to think that
the Court would not recognize their supremacy under the Supremacy Clause. The omission
simply may reflect the domestic nature of the underlying tort question before the Court.
220. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
221. Id. at 79.
222. Id. (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
223. See id. at 77-78.
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III. GENERAL LAW IN FEDERAL COURT AFTER ERIE
In the course of explaining the unconstitutionality of the Swift
doctrine, the Erie Court famously declared that “[t]here is no federal
general common law.”  Commentators have struggled to under-224
stand how the Court could make this seemingly unequivocal
statement in light of the Court’s subsequent application of so-called
“federal common law” in disputes between states, admiralty cases,
and other specific enclaves.  The Court’s statement, however,225
conflated two kinds of unwritten law—general law and common law.
As discussed, the common law received by the states included both
general law and local law.  Although federal courts applied state226
common law in the exercise of their jurisdiction, the United States
as a whole never possessed any municipal common law of its own.
Over a century before Erie, in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,
the Court rejected the idea that the United States had a national
common law of crimes.  And in Wheaton v. Peters, the Court ex-227
plained more broadly:
It is clear, there can be no common law of the United States.
The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign
and independent states; each of which may have its local usages,
customs and common law. There is no principle which pervades
the union and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in
the constitution or laws of the union. The common law could be
made a part of our federal system, only by legislative adoption.228
Thirty years later, Swift did not contradict Wheaton or suggest
the existence of a national common law. Rather, the Supreme Court
merely applied general law when the state itself applied general law
to the question before the Court.  This practice was uncontrover-229
sial in the absence of an applicable local state rule of decision. The
224. Id. at 78.
225. See Nelson, supra note 27, at 505-19 (describing federal common law enclaves in which
courts apply general law principles).
226. See supra text accompanying note 47.
227. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812). 
228. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834).
229. See supra Part I.C.
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Erie problem arose because federal courts began applying “general
law” in the teeth of controlling local state rules of decision.  Erie230
rejected this federal judicial expansion of general law into areas
properly governed by local state regulation.  In this sense, under231
the Constitution, “[t]here is no federal general common law” made
by judges that is capable of displacing local state law. 
Erie should not be read, however, to suggest that federal courts
can never apply general law. In practice, as Professor Caleb Nelson
has explained, federal courts continue to apply general law in
various contexts—even after Erie.  The question is under what232
conditions are federal courts justified in doing so. As we have ex-
plained in prior work, federal judicial application of general law in
certain circumstances has played a crucial role—before and after
Erie—in upholding the structure of government established by the
Constitution and its precise allocation of powers.233
In our view, Erie’s categorical rejection of general law should be
understood to apply only in cases like Swift and Erie—that is, cases
involving adjudication of matters that fall within the exclusive or
concurrent regulatory authority of the states. In such cases, the
negative implication of the Supremacy Clause requires respect for 
controlling state law unless and until it is displaced by “the supreme
Law of the Land,” adopted in accordance with prescribed federal
lawmaking procedures. In theory, this could include respect for a
state’s decision to apply general law (or the “majority rule” as
reflected by a Restatement), should a state adopt such a practice.
On the other hand, a different analysis applies to matters that the
Constitution places beyond the authority of the states. For example,
the Constitution assigns certain matters—such as the exercise of
specific foreign relations powers—to the exclusive authority of the
federal government. State law has no application to such matters
under the Supremacy Clause because the Constitution itself assigns
governmental authority elsewhere. In such matters, the Supremacy
Clause poses no barrier to the application of general law in federal
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
232. Nelson, supra note 27, at 505-25.
233. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 15, at 7 (explaining that principles derived from the law
of nations have been used to uphold the Constitution’s allocation of power throughout U.S.
history).
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court. To the contrary, in certain cases, the Supremacy Clause
may require judicial application of general law to uphold the
Constitution’s allocation of specific powers to the federal political
branches.234
We do not mean in this Section to provide an exhaustive account
of post-Erie federal judicial application of general law or federal
common law (such as in admiralty cases). Rather, we simply make
two important points about the role of general law in federal court
after Erie. First, Erie generally holds that federal courts must apply
state law governing matters within the exclusive or concurrent
regulatory authority of the states, absent a controlling provision of
the supreme law of the land. Second, Erie does not prohibit federal
judicial application of general law to matters beyond the regulatory
authority of the states.
A. Matters Within State Authority
In declaring their independence from Great Britain in 1776, the
American states held themselves out to be “Free and Independent
States,” with “full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract
Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things
which Independent States may of right do.”  The states quickly235
used this power to adopt individual constitutions to govern matters
within their respective territories. In 1781, they adopted the Articles
of Confederation, by which they “enter[ed] into a firm league of
friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security
of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare.”  This236
arrangement soon proved inadequate, however, because it created
a Congress of states dependent upon individual members to provide
funding and implement its decisions, but that gave Congress no
effective power to enforce its commands.  237
234. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 29, at 732-35.
235. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
236. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III, para. 1.
237. See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1839-40 (2010); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 138 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that the United States in Congress
operated solely through the states and had “no power to exact obedience, or punish
disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture
of privileges, or by any other constitutional means”).
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In 1787, the states sent delegates to a Constitutional Convention
to consider ways of improving the Articles of Confederation. Some
members initially believed that the Articles could be augmented by
giving Congress power to coerce states.  Others argued that238
coercive power over states was not a viable option and would lead to
a civil war.  The Convention quickly abandoned any pretense of239
improving the Articles of Confederation and instead proposed an
entirely new plan of government.  The Constitution established a240
federal government capable of exercising its own legislative,
executive, and judicial powers. This meant that the federal govern-
ment would not be dependent upon the states and could operate
directly on the citizenry in carrying out such important functions as
raising revenue,  raising and supporting the armed forces,241 242
punishing violations of the law of nations,  and regulating243
commerce among the several states.244
Although the Constitution gave the federal government the
means of carrying its powers into execution, it limited the powers
assigned to the federal government both substantively and proce-
durally. As Madison explained, “[t]he powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and de-
fined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite.”  At least in theory, therefore, the245
Constitution left the states with exclusive power to regulate num-
erous matters within their borders, free from federal interference.
In practice, however, states appear to possess a vanishingly small
sphere of exclusive authority, due primarily to Congress’s expansive
assertion—and the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation—of
238. Clark, supra note 237, at 1843-47.
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
242. See id. cl. 12.
243. See id. cl. 10. For a discussion of the states’ failure to heed the Continental Congress’s
request that states enact laws to remedy violations of the law of nations, see Anthony J. Bellia
Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
445, 494-507 (2011).
244. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
245. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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the commerce power.  Thus, today many matters are subject to246
concurrent regulation by the states and the federal government.
The Founders understood that the establishment of two govern-
ments with overlapping powers—operating in the same territory,
with respect to the same people, at the same time—would require
a mechanism for resolving conflicts between state and federal law.
After rejecting the alternative mechanisms of military force and a
congressional negative over state law, the Founders chose the
Supremacy Clause to perform this function. As discussed, the
Clause recognizes only three sources of law as “the supreme Law of
the Land”—“[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States.”  And the negative implication of this provision—as we247
have explained—is that, absent an applicable provision of the
supreme law of the land, the Constitution gives courts no warrant
to disregard state law as applied to matters within the concurrent
or exclusive authority of the states. Erie recognized this principle in
declaring that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State.”  248
As a constitutional matter, Erie makes sense as applied to
matters—like ordinary tort liability—that fall within the concurrent
or exclusive authority of the states. Under the Supremacy Clause,
state law (whether adopted by the state legislature in a statute or
by the state’s highest court in a decision) governs such questions
unless and until the appropriate actors adopt a contrary provision
of “the supreme Law of the Land” pursuant to constitutionally
prescribed lawmaking procedures. In the absence of such supreme
federal law, Erie concluded that as far as federal courts are con-
cerned, “[t]he authority and only authority is the State.”  Thus,249
absent a controlling provision of supreme federal law, Erie requires
246. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-91 (2012)
(affirming that Congress may regulate local economic activities that in aggregate
substantially affect interstate commerce); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15-19 (2005) (same);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561, 565-66 (1995) (same).
247. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
248. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
249. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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federal courts to apply controlling state law, including state choice
of law rules (and, in theory, even a state’s choice to apply general
law to a case within its regulatory power). As discussed in the next
Section, however, there are some matters that the Constitution
places beyond the authority of the states. As to those matters, the
Supremacy Clause does not require—but generally forbids—the
application of state law.
B. Matters Beyond State Authority
The Constitution places some matters beyond the authority of the
states, both expressly and by necessary implication. For example,
the Constitution places certain powers relating to foreign relations
beyond state authority. The Constitution vested the federal political
branches with the exclusive means of recognizing foreign sover-
eigns, “including the powers to send and receive ambassadors and
to make treaties.”  At the time of the Founding, recognition250
signified that one nation would treat another as a free and inde-
pendent state under the law of nations and respect its accompany-
ing rights under such law. It was particularly important that the
nation speak with one voice in such matters because the Founders
understood that the “Union will undoubtedly be answerable to
foreign powers for the conduct of its members.”  Thus, “Florida’s251
decision to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, for example,
would necessarily undermine the foreign relations of the United
States as a whole,”  and could even lead to hostilities.  In addi-252 253
tion to the power of recognition, the Constitution gave the federal
political branches exclusive authority to make war, issue reprisals,
and authorize captures.  State action that commenced, conducted,254
or escalated hostilities with other nations would violate the Constitu-
tion’s exclusive vesting of these powers in the federal political
branches.  As we have recently explained, courts have long applied255
250. Bellia & Clark, supra note 29, at 762.
251. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
252. Clark, supra note 6, at 1298.
253. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“All questions in which [ambassadors] are concerned are ... directly connected with the public
peace.”).
254. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
255. Bellia & Clark, supra note 29, at 762-63.
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traditional principles of the general law of state-state relations in
ways that uphold the exclusive powers of the federal political
branches over recognition, war, reprisals, and captures.  The best256
explanation for this practice is not that federal courts possess
general common-law lawmaking powers, but that specific constitu-
tional provisions sometimes require federal courts to apply such
law.
Accordingly, even after Erie, federal courts have properly upheld
basic features of the constitutional structure by applying general
law to certain matters beyond state regulatory authority. This
Section describes two such matters—cases involving the territorial
integrity and absolute equality of the states, and cases involving the
exclusive powers of the federal political branches to conduct foreign
relations. In these matters, the Court has applied general law
principles—sometimes (mis)characterized as federal common law—
in ways that uphold basic aspects of the constitutional design.
1. Territorial Integrity and Absolute Equality of States
Under the Constitution, state authority is limited by the ter-
ritorial integrity and absolute equality of the states. Every
state—whether present at the Founding or later admitted by
Congress —had defined boundaries when it joined the Union. The
Constitution protects these boundaries by providing that “no new
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures
of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”  In addition,257
the Constitution presupposes that all states are coequal sovereigns
within the federal union. The constitutional equality of the states
is reflected by their equal suffrage in the Senate,  and the258
Constitution even exempts this feature of the constitutional
structure from amendment under Article V.  The constitutional259
256. Id. at 733-34, 779-808 & n.207.
257. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
258. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator
shall have one Vote.”).
259. See id. art. V (providing, as an exception to the amendment process, that “no State,
712 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:655
equality of the states is the basis for the Supreme Court’s longstand-
ing “equal footing” doctrine, under which new states enjoy the same
rights and privileges as the original states.  Indeed, the Court has260
long recognized that “the constitutional equality of the States is
essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized.”261
The territorial integrity and constitutional equality of the states
provide one basis for the appropriate use of general law in federal
court after Erie. On the same day that Erie declared “[t]here is no
federal general common law,”  the Supreme Court applied “federal262
common law” in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co. to determine an interstate boundary and apportion water in an
interstate stream.  The Court explained that “neither the statutes263
nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive” upon these
questions.  Rather, the constitutional principle of “equality of264
right” must resolve such questions because they are beyond the au-
thority of any individual state to govern.  Accordingly, in appor-265
tioning water in an interstate stream, the Court has pursued “an
equitable apportionment, ... having regard to the ‘equal level or
plane on which all the States stand, in point of power and right,
under our constitutional system.’”266
Similarly, in resolving boundary disputes between states, the
Court has borrowed doctrines from the general law of nations as a
means of upholding the constitutional equality of the states. Early
on, the Court described such doctrines as founded upon the “perfect
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns” under the law of
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”).
260. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845) (“When Alabama was
admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she succeeded to all the
rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date
of the cession.”); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 289 (1992) (“The
Supreme Court has long treated the equal footing doctrine as having constitutional
significance.”).
261. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
262. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
263. 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
264. Id. 
265. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931).
266. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465, 470 (1922)).
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nations,  and the Court has applied them to resolve interstate267
disputes ever since. For example, in New Jersey v. Delaware, the
Court applied an international principle, the doctrine of the
thalweg, to ascertain the location of the states’ border in the
Delaware River. “The Thalweg, or downway, is the track taken by
boats in their course down the stream, which is that of the strongest
current.”  The Court has determined state borders according to the268
thalweg, rather than the geographical center of the river, to ensure
that both states would enjoy equal access to the river for purposes
of navigation and commerce.  In this way, general law supplied a269
rule well suited to upholding the constitutional equality of the
states.
Although the Court has sometimes characterized the rules appli-
cable in disputes between states as “federal common law,”  these270
rules are often nothing more than general law rules that the Court
has borrowed from customary bodies of law to implement some
feature of the constitutional structure, such as the constitutional
equality of the states.  At least in such cases, the application of271
general law in federal court does not run afoul of Erie. Disputes
between states are beyond the authority of either state to resolve,
and the Constitution itself requires federal courts to apply general
law rules designed to uphold the constitutional equality of the
states. Thus, the application of general law in such cases does not
violate the negative implication of the Supremacy Clause (as it did
267. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
268. 291 U.S. 361, 379 (1934).
269. See id. at 380-81 (“Bays and rivers are more than geometrical divisions. They are the
arteries of trade and travel.”).
270. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938).
271. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975) (identifying examples of “constitutional common
law” inspired and authorized by various constitutional provisions, but “subject to amendment,
modification, or even reversal by Congress”). In this context, “federal common law” connotes
a rule of decision capable of displacing contrary state law, but the source of the displacement
is the Constitution rather than any independent policy crafted by judges. Not all rules applied
to resolve disputes between states consist of “off-the-rack” general law principles. On occa-
sion, the Court must craft novel rules to deal with novel problems, but even on these occasions
the Court is sensitive to the constitutional equality of the states in crafting such rules.
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in Erie), but rather furthers a basic feature of the Constitution,
which is itself part of “the supreme Law of the Land.”272
2. Foreign Relations Powers of the Political Branches
The Constitution assigns certain foreign relations powers
exclusively to the federal political branches, such as recognizing
foreign nations,  declaring and making war,  and authorizing273 274
captures and reprisals.  From the time of the Founding to the275
present, federal courts have applied traditional principles of the
general law of state-state relations in a way that upholds the
Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations powers or their exer-
cise. Although the precise scope of the federal courts’ power to apply
the law of nations is the subject of heated academic debate,  we276
believe that the best understanding of the constitutional structure
and Supreme Court precedent is that—at least in some cases—
federal courts must apply principles derived from the general law of
nations in order to uphold the political branches’ exclusive Article
I and II powers over recognition, war, captures, and reprisal.
As we have explained elsewhere, the Founders presumed that
federal courts would enforce those background principles of the law
of nations necessary to respect the sovereignty of other nations and
to maintain peace.  These principles, well known to the Founders277
from their political experience and through the writings of
272. This conclusion does not mean that federal courts have complete discretion to adopt
general law of their own choosing. To the contrary, separation of powers and the procedural
safeguards of federalism constrain federal courts to adopt only those rules necessary to uphold
an identifiable feature of the constitutional structure, such as the constitutional equality of
the states.
273. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President has power to send
ambassadors with the consent of the Senate); id. § 3 (providing that the President has power
to receive ambassadors); Bellia & Clark, supra note 29, at 764-69 (explaining that these
powers provide the means of recognizing foreign states).
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
275. Id.
276. Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825-27 (1998) (arguing that federal courts have the power to apply
the law of nations even if not adopted by the political branches), with Jack L. Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1620-24 (1997) (arguing
that the law of nations applies only when state or federal law incorporates it).
277. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 15, at 39, 41-44.
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Emmerich de Vattel and others,  required respect for other278
nations’ rights to exercise territorial sovereignty, conduct diplomatic
relations, exercise neutral rights, and peaceably enjoy liberty.279
Article III of the Constitution authorizes federal jurisdiction over
various categories of cases and controversies likely to implicate
these rights under the law of nations.  At the Founding, if a fed-280
eral court failed to protect such rights, the offended nation would
have had just cause to retaliate against the United States, including
by force.  The Constitution, however, vests exclusive authority in281
the political branches to recognize foreign nations as full sovereigns
under the law of nations, to decide questions of war and peace, and
to authorize reprisals and captures.  Accordingly, federal courts282
have protected the rights of recognized foreign nations under the
law of nations in ways that have upheld the political branches’
authority over recognition and avoided usurping their powers to
make war and authorize reprisals and captures.
Throughout U.S. history, the Supreme Court has tied the appli-
cation of traditional principles of the general law of nations to the
Constitution’s allocation of power to the political branches. In some
cases, particularly decisions of the Marshall Court, the Court ex-
pressly tied its application of general law to the political branches’
recognition, war, reprisal, and capture powers.  In other cases,283
including more recent cases in the twentieth century, the Court
either tied such law to the Constitution’s allocation of foreign
relations powers more generally  or simply applied such law in a284
way that was consistent with the political branches’ exclusive power
278. See id. at 15-16 (“Vattel’s treatise, The Law of Nations, was well known in England
and America at the time of the founding.”).
279. See id. at 16-19 (describing perfect rights).
280. See id. at 37-44. 
281. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 17, at 5 (London, J. Newberry et al.,
1759) (“The perfect right is that to which is joined the right of constraining those who refuse
to fulfill the obligation resulting from it.”).
282. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815) (“[T]he Court is decidedly
of opinion that reciprocating to the subjects of a nation, or retaliating on them ... is a political
not a legal measure. It is for the consideration of the government not of its Courts.”). 
284. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (concluding that New York’s
failure to apply the act of state doctrine, derived from the law of nations, was not a “power ...
accorded a State in our constitutional system”).
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over recognition, war, reprisals, and captures.  We argue in recent285
work that the best reading of the Court’s decisions—consistent with
the Constitution’s original public meaning—is that the judiciary
must apply certain traditional principles of general law when
necessary to uphold these specific powers of the political branches.286
The application of “general law” in such cases does not run afoul of
Erie because they concern matters within the exclusive constitu-
tional authority of the federal government and therefore beyond the
power of the states. In addition, the Constitution itself requires the
application of general law, thus satisfying the Supremacy Clause.
Two principles derived from traditional general law—the act of state
doctrine and head of state immunity—illustrate these points.
a. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine establishes that neither federal nor state
courts may “examine the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recog-
nized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty
or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal prin-
ciples.”  The doctrine has deep roots in traditional principles of287
territorial sovereignty recognized by the general law of nations. The
Supreme Court upheld such foreign sovereignty in several cases
that arose during the first decades after ratification. For example,
in 1812, the Marshall Court observed that sovereignty confers upon
nations “absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective
territories.”288
285. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 29, at 799-805.
286. See id. at 732. This approach does not rely on “freestanding” conceptions of separation
of powers. To the contrary, our understanding of the Constitution relies on specific
constitutional provisions read in light of the background principles of the law of nations
against which they were drafted. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944-45 (2011); John F. Manning, The Absurdity
Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2467 (2003) (explaining that “background conventions, if
sufficiently firmly established, may be considered part of the interpretive environment in
which [the lawmaker] acts”).
287. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
288. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); see id.
(“[J]urisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”);
see also Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 336 (1822) (holding that a judicial
inquiry into the means by which another nation acquired a public ship “would be to exert the
2013] GENERAL LAW IN FEDERAL COURT 717
Although the Supreme Court applied the act of state doctrine
numerous times,  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino required289
the Court to reconsider the doctrine in light of Erie. Sabbatino was
a diversity action that arose out of Cuba’s nationalization of sugar
companies located in Cuba and owned in part by American citi-
zens.  The parties asked the Court to decide whether the original290
owner or the Cuban government was entitled to the proceeds of
sugar sold by Cuba after the expropriation.  The Court observed291
that “New York has enunciated the act of state doctrine in terms
that echo those of federal decisions.”  Thus, the Court could have292
resolved the case by applying the act of state doctrine as a matter
of state law.  Instead, however, Sabbatino distinguished Erie and293
held that “the scope of the act of state doctrine must be determined
according to federal law.”294
In reaching this conclusion, the Sabbatino Court began by stating
that “[i]t seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like
the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie.”  Without295
much analysis, the Court noted that the act of state doctrine was
most analogous to “the bodies of law applied between States over
boundaries and in regard to the apportionment of interstate
waters.”  The Court observed that Hinderlider was decided the296
same day as Erie, and identified a strong federal interest in
ensuring an equitable apportionment of interstate waters notwith-
standing contrary state law.  The Court stated that “[t]he prob-297
lems surrounding the act of state doctrine are, albeit for different
right of examining into the validity of the acts of the foreign sovereign, and to sit in judgment
upon them in cases where he has not conceded the jurisdiction, and where it would be
inconsistent with his own supremacy”).
289. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S.
304 (1918); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250 (1897).
290. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401.
291. Id. at 400-06.
292. Id. at 424.
293. See id. at 425 (“[O]ur conclusions might well be the same whether we dealt with this
problem as one of state law or federal law.” (internal citation omitted)).
294. Id. at 427.
295. Id. at 425.
296. Id. at 426.
297. Id. at 426-27.
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reasons, as intrinsically federal as are those involved in water
apportionment or boundary disputes.”298
Those “different reasons” relate to the Court’s understanding that
“[t]he act of state doctrine does ... have ‘constitutional’ underpin-
nings.”  These “underpinnings” trigger the Supremacy Clause and299
render Erie inapplicable. According to the Court, the doctrine
“arises out of the basic relationships between branches of gov-
ernment in a system of separation of powers,”  and “its continuing300
vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution
of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.”  The act of301
state doctrine reflects the judiciary’s sense “that its engagement in
the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder
rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and
for the community of nations as a whole.”  In other words, it re-302
flects “a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the
Judiciary and  the National Executive in ordering our relation-
ships with other members of the international community.”  In303
light of these considerations, the Court has come to understand the
act of state doctrine as “a consequence of domestic separation of
powers.”304
The separation of powers rationale for the act of state doctrine
has federalism implications as well. Because the doctrine rests on
the Constitution’s allocation of exclusive powers to the political
branches of the federal government, the states are not free to depart
from it. Doing so, under the Court’s rationale, would usurp the
exclusive power of the political branches to decide when, whether,
and how the United States should override the doctrine and retal-
298. Id. at 427.
299. Id. at 423.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 427-28.
302. Id. at 423.
303. Id. at 425. For wrongs created by foreign acts of state, the Court suggested that the
remedy lies not with the judiciary, but “along the channels of diplomacy” conducted by the
executive. Id. at 418 (quoting Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937)).
304. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990). As we
explain elsewhere, the Sabbatino Court could have invoked original constitutional meaning
and a long line of Court precedent to rest its decision more explicitly on the Constitution’s
specific allocation of recognition and reprisal powers to the federal political branches. Bellia
& Clark, supra note 29, at 815-18.
2013] GENERAL LAW IN FEDERAL COURT 719
iate against other nations. Accordingly, the Sabbatino Court
properly concluded that Erie is inapplicable in this context.  If the305
Constitution prevents states from abrogating the act of state
doctrine, then the Constitution does not require federal courts
sitting in diversity to apply state law purporting to do so. Erie rests
on the premise that in the absence of “the supreme Law of the
Land,” state law continues to govern in both state and federal
court.  In Erie, the general law applied by federal courts had no306
grounding in supreme federal law, and thus the judiciary’s dis-
placement of state law contradicted the negative implication of
the Supremacy Clause. In act of state cases, by contrast, the
Constitution itself displaces contrary state law under the
Supremacy Clause by allocating exclusive powers over recognition,
war, reprisals, and captures to the political branches of the federal
government. All of these powers—especially the recognition of for-
eign sovereigns—imply that courts and states should not take it
upon themselves to abrogate the traditional territorial rights of
foreign sovereigns under the general law of nations. The Sabbatino
Court thus distinguished Erie and concluded that “the act of state
doctrine is a principle of decision binding on federal and state courts
alike.”307
b. Head of State Immunity
The Constitution’s assignment of specific foreign relations powers
to the federal political branches also sheds light on post-Erie cases
involving other rules drawn from the general law of nations. For
example, the Constitution’s allocation of powers to the political
branches suggests that courts should apply general law to recognize
immunity for heads of recognized foreign states even after Erie.
Head of state immunity is one of the most important and well-
known principles of the law of nations not yet codified. The Supreme
Court has acknowledged its importance since the Founding,  and308
305. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425-27.
306. See supra Part II.C.
307. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427.
308. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (“[T]he whole
civilized world” recognizes “the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or
detention within a foreign territory.”).
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nations continue to respect it. Because it derives from the general
law of nations, head of state immunity presents the same potential
Erie issues as the act of state doctrine and doctrines applied in
disputes between states. Like those doctrines, head of state immu-
nity is a form of general law derived from traditional principles of
the law of nations. And like those doctrines, head of state immunity
is necessary to uphold an important feature of the constitutional
design—in this case, the exclusive constitutional powers of the
political branches to recognize foreign states, make and conduct
war, and authorize reprisals and captures. Accordingly, application
of head of state immunity in federal court is both consistent with
Erie and necessary to uphold the Constitution’s allocation of
powers.309
As we have discussed in prior work, head of state immunity is
closely related to the broader doctrine of foreign sovereign immu-
nity.  Prior to Erie, federal and state courts resolved claims to310
immunity by looking to the general law of nations.  In 1976,311
Congress specified the requirements of foreign sovereign immunity
in U.S. courts in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA or
Act).  Most federal courts interpreted the FSIA to encompass312
immunity for high-ranking foreign officials as well as foreign
states.  In 2010, however, in Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme313
Court held that the term “foreign state” as used in the Act does not
“include an official acting on behalf of the foreign state,”  thus314
leaving head of state immunity uncodified. Samantar involved a
suit against the former Prime Minister of Somalia for acts of torture
and extrajudicial killing that he allegedly authorized while head of
state.  Although the Court found the FSIA to be inapplicable, it315
309. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 15, at 90.
310. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 29, at 825.
311. See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The
Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 924 (2011).
312. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (2006)).
313. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2008); Keller v.
Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y
Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan,
75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th
Cir. 1990).
314. 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010).
315. Id. at 2282.
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indicated that, on remand, the defendant “may be entitled to
immunity under the common law.”  The Court did not discuss the316
content of such “common law” or why it might be applicable in
federal court.317
Under the Constitution’s allocation of powers to the political
branches, however, there is a strong argument that the Constitution
itself requires state and federal courts to grant immunity to heads
of recognized foreign states until the political branches themselves
decide to abrogate it.  Recognition of a foreign state or government318
by the political branches signifies that the United States will
respect the rights of that sovereign under the law of nations.319
Accordingly, failure by either state or federal courts to accord
immunity to a sitting head of a recognized state would countermand
the political branches’ decision to recognize that state and possibly
usurp the political branches’ exclusive powers to make war and to
authorize reprisals and captures.  For this reason, courts should320
continue to apply general law immunity to heads of recognized
foreign states not because Article III empowers them to make
“federal common law,” but rather because the Constitution’s
316. Id. at 2292-93.
317. The Court did, however, suggest that the State Department may have a “role in
determinations regarding individual official immunity” similar to the role it played in
determinations of foreign sovereign immunity prior to the enactment of the FSIA. Id. at 2291.
Commentators are divided on the propriety and effect of case-by-case suggestions of immunity
by the executive branch. Compare Wuerth, supra note  311 (arguing against judicial deference
to executive suggestions of immunity), with Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole
Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 911 (2011) (arguing in favor of judicial
deference to executive suggestions of immunity).
318. Accordingly, we do not categorically accept the conclusion of Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith that “[a]fter Erie, ... a federal court can no longer apply [customary international
law] in the absence of some domestic authorization to do so, as it could under the regime of
general common law,” Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 852-53
(1997), at least insofar as they suggest that domestic authorization must be an act of the
political branches. See id. at 870. In our view, the Constitution itself provides domestic
authorization—indeed, a domestic prescription—that federal courts apply traditional
principles of the law of nations when necessary to uphold the allocation of powers to the
political branches.
319. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 29, at 735.
320. In the absence of recognition, courts have greater latitude to reject claims of head of
state immunity. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying
head of state immunity to General Manuel Noriega because the President had never
recognized Noriega as the legitimate head of Panama and had manifested an intent to deny
such immunity by capturing and prosecuting him).
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allocation of exclusive powers to the political branches over
recognition, war, reprisals, and captures in Articles I and II requires
courts to do so.
From this perspective, it would be fallacious to read Erie to per-
mit federal courts to apply certain traditional principles of the law
of nations only if state law has adopted them. If the Constitution
requires the application of such principles, then Erie and the
Supremacy Clause are satisfied. A Second Circuit case that arose
just ten years after Erie is illustrative. In Bergman v. De Sieyes,
Bergman, a New Yorker, sued De Sieyes, an accredited minister of
France, by serving him as he passed through New York on his way
to his diplomatic post in Bolivia.  De Sieyes removed the case to321
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and
asserted diplomatic immunity under general principles of interna-
tional law.  Although Congress codified diplomatic immunity in322
the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978,  such immunity was not cod-323
ified at the time of Bergman. Thus, the case presented the question
whether the court should apply state law or the general law of
nations in determining the applicability of the defense. Under the
apparent influence of Erie, Judge Learned Hand explained for the
Second Circuit that “the law of New York determines [the validity
of service], and, although the courts of that state look to interna-
tional law as a source of New York law, their interpretation of
international law is controlling upon us.”  Upon examining New324
York decisions and other sources, the court was “disposed to believe
that the courts of New York would today hold that a diplomat in
transitu would be entitled to the same immunity as a diplomat in
situ.”325
321. 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948).
322. Id. at 360-61.
323. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (2006).
324. Bergman, 170 F.2d at 361; see Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (1984) (“So great a judge as Learned Hand apparently
assumed that international law was part of state common law for this purpose and that a
federal court in diversity cases had to apply international law as determined by the courts of
the state in which it sat.”).
325. Bergman, 170 F.2d at 363. Judge Hand did leave open the possibility that a state’s
departure from international law could give rise to a federal question: “Whether an avowed
refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension
of it, would present a federal question we need not consider, for neither is present here.” Id.
at 361.
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In our view, treating the question in Bergman as one of state law
under Erie represents a significant category mistake. Erie’s
Supremacy Clause rationale applies only to matters—such as torts
and commercial transactions—that fall within the exclusive or con-
current authority of the states. In such cases, judicial reliance on
general law to disregard state law circumvents the political and
procedural safeguards of federalism built into the Supremacy
Clause. Erie’s Supremacy Clause rationale does not apply to
matters—such as the rights of diplomats in transit—that fall
outside the constitutional authority of the states. In such cases, the
Constitution itself displaces state law by assigning exclusive auth-
ority over such matters to the political branches of the federal
government. Specifically, Bergman implicated at least two powers
assigned by the Constitution exclusively to the political branches:
the recognition power and the power to declare war.  For these326
reasons, Judge Hand should have concluded—as the Supreme Court
later did in Sabbatino—that Erie was inapplicable in this context
because the Constitution’s allocation of powers preempted state law
and required the application of general law.
CONCLUSION
Despite the widespread assumption that Erie banished general
law from federal court, the Constitution itself continues to require
the application of general law in certain contexts. The key to
understanding the place of general law in federal court after Erie is
to distinguish between matters that the Constitution leaves within
the exclusive or concurrent authority of the states and matters
that the Constitution places beyond state power. As to the former
category, the negative implication of the Supremacy Clause requires
federal courts to apply controlling state law, including state judge-
made law, unless and until constitutionally designated actors take
the steps necessary to adopt a contrary provision of “the supreme
Law of the Land.” As to the latter category, the Supremacy Clause
poses no absolute barrier to the application of general law in federal
court. In fact, sometimes the judiciary must apply such law in order
to uphold key features of the constitutional structure, including the
326. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 15, at 82-84; Bellia & Clark, supra note 29, at 824.
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Constitution’s exclusive allocation of specific foreign relations
powers to the federal political branches.
